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INTRODUCTION
On July 8th and 9th, 2009, the New York Times published two see-
mingly unconnected articles about China. One focused on China's latest
rejection of an international agreement to curb greenhouse gas emis-
sions,' while the other concerned clashes between ethnic Uighurs and
Han in Xinjiang Province in Western China.2 Although these two stories
appeared to have little to do with one another, they were in fact closely
linked. China's unwillingness to join a climate change agreement is di-
rectly related to its internal political, economic, and social dynamics: the
very existence of the governing regime depends on its ability to ensure
social stability in Western China by guaranteeing high rates of econom-
ic growth. A climate change agreement threatens this continued growth,
and thus threatens China's fragile internal balance.
Scholars have consistently missed this vital connection because they
have mistakenly treated China as a "black box": a unitary state whose
domestic idiosyncrasies are invisible or unimportant on the world
stage.3 This analytical error has had serious consequences, producing
1. Peter Baker, Poorer Nations Reject a Target on Emission Cut, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at
Al.
2. Edward Wong, Clashes in China Shed Light on Ethnic Divide, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at
A4.
3. We employ the term here to mean simply a state whose internal behavior is invisible, and
thus appears as a single body with one avenue of inputs and outputs. The term is borrowed from
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overly optimistic projections about China's incentives to fight climate
change and a frustrating inability to appreciate the international impact
of China's internal challenges.
The conventional wisdom on China's willingness to join an interna-
tional climate change agreement reflects this analytical error. A near
consensus has emerged that the world as a whole would benefit from an
international agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions, and that
such an agreement would be worthless without the participation of Chi-
na, now the world's leading emitter of carbon dioxide. 4 Many scholars
acknowledge that joining an international agreement is not in China's
self-interest. 5 China's rapidly growing economy has much to lose from
emissions limitations, while the country has little to gain from an
agreement that curbs global warming, because it stands to lose relatively
little if warming occurs. Yet despite this seemingly intractable problem,
scholars nonetheless conclude that China can be persuaded relatively
easily to curb carbon emissions through a series of side payments or
other economic inducements. These scholars similarly believe that this
can be accomplished in a manner that is politically and economically
palatable to the United States and Europe.6
neorealist international theory. Neorealist scholars treat the state as a black box, arguing that in-
ternal domestic characteristics are not relevant as explanatory variables for state behavior in in-
ternational politics. See generally JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER
POLITICS (2001); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). But see
ROBERT O. KEOHANE, NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (1986); Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberal-
ism, and Cooperation, 24 INT'L SEC. 42 (1999); Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, Is Any-
body Still a Realist?, 24 INT'L SEC. 5 (1999) (outlining the contradictions of neorealism and the
analytical difficulties that neorealists have in explaining recent phenomena in international poli-
tics). In a short symposium article, Jonathan Wiener briefly explores a few of the possible internal
political and social distributional consequences of climate change polices for China. Jonathan B.
Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1819-21
(2008).
4. John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes U.S. as World's Biggest C0 2 Emitter,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, June 19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/1 9/
china.usnews.
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008) (proposing side payments as an inducement to China);
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007); RICHARD B. STEWART &
JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO (2003) (proposing
side payments); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Cli-
mate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675 (2008)
(proposing side payments as an inducement to China); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate
Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 905 (2008) (proposing that the United States
leverage its market power).
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
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We believe that this conclusion is fundamentally flawed. In this Ar-
ticle, we challenge the dominant analytical approach and its conclusions
by prying the lid off the Chinese "black box." In doing so, we explore
the impact of internal political and economic dynamics on China's in-
terest in an agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions. Our conclu-
sions suggest that it will be extremely difficult-far more difficult than
anyone has yet appreciated-to reach a meaningful climate change ac-
cord in the immediate future.
Having abandoned the model of China as a unitary actor, we find
within China several striking internal characteristics. First, though Chi-
na is a Communist state run entirely by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), it has nonetheless delegated tremendous authority to provincial
and local governments. 7 Second, the CCP no longer derives its legitima-
cy from Marxist-Leninist ideology. The CCP's success is now measured
by its ability to create private-sector economic growth. 8 Third and per-
haps most significantly, China encompasses a highly urbanized, highly
industrialized, highly prosperous East, and a much more rural, agrarian,
and poor West.9 Among industrialized nations, China is remarkable in
its domestic heterogeneity. To treat it as just another international actor,
as other global warming studies do, is to overlook these critically impor-
tant internal features.
These three characteristics, we argue, profoundly affect China's in-
centive structure and its willingness to join an international climate
change agreement. Due to the peculiarities of China's governmental
structure and to the pressure the CCP faces to accelerate economic
growth in poorer, agrarian provinces, China is even less inclined to en-
ter into an emissions-limiting agreement than prior analyses have rec-
ognized-and surprisingly less capable of enforcing such an agreement,
even if it were to sign one. Indeed, it is almost a misnomer to speak of a
single "China." We describe the nation as a combination of "Two Chi-
nas"-prosperous Eastern China, and developing Western China.' 0 The
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. "The Two Chinas" is a phrase typically used to refer to the People's Republic of China
and Taiwan. See, e.g., Ian Taylor, The Two Chinas Compete in Africa-Mainland China; Taiwan,
271 CONTEMP. REv. 192 (1997). Like any good metaphor, it has been adopted for use in a variety
of other contexts, in particular to describe the growing income disparities within the country. See,
e.g., Barry Peterson, A Tale of Two Chinas, CBS NEWS, May 27, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2005/05/26/listening-post/main697988.shtml. We push the metaphor another step further
here, employing it to describe two halves of China separated by geographic, economic, religious,
and ethnic schisms. Our subtitle is a self-conscious take on this typical usage and Michael Van-
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central government that binds them together is far weaker than the ca-
sual observer might assume."1
The key analytical error in the black box view of China as a unitary
nation is the propensity to reduce the Two Chinas to a single, fairly
wealthy entity that resembles Eastern China. To the contrary, the pres-
ence of Two Chinas, side-by-side under a single national heading, is
likely to create problems for attempts to negotiate a meaningful interna-
tional agreement on carbon emissions, problems that are invisible to any
view that fails to consider China's complicated internal structure. The
issue is threefold.
First, since the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served
as the basis for the party's authority, the CCP has adopted economic
growth as the central justification for its one-party rule. The CCP has
pegged its political future to a type of "performance legitimacy"12-it
governs because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of
living than any alternative form of central authority. In Eastern China,
the CCP's approach has been a nearly unqualified success. Special
coastal economic zones, favorable banking policies, and massive decen-
tralization of government have combined to spur blistering economic
growth. Western China, however, has been left starkly behind: per capi-
ta gross domestic product (GDP) in Western China is less than half of
what it is in Eastern China. The result has been rising income inequality,
social instability, and dramatic divisions between East and West, rural
and city, and peasants and urban residents, along with the creation of a
roaming underclass of Western Chinese seeking work in the coastal ci-
ties. 13 Worse still, these social schisms coincide with ethnic and reli-
gious fault lines: Western China is home to many ethnic minority
groups that harbor substantial animosity toward CCP rule. Poorer condi-
tions in the West have created the political environment for the emer-
gence of separatist movements. Brisk economic growth in Western Chi-
na has thus become a political imperative for the CCP, and the CCP has
denbergh's excellent article. See Vandenbergh, supra note 5; Donald C. Clarke, Economic Devel-
opment and the Rights Hypothesis, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003) (using the phrase to refer to a
test of the "rights hypothesis" through a case study of post-Mao China). Others, most prominently
the Chinese government itself, have used the same phrase to refer to the political situation sur-
rounding China and Taiwan, though of course no one has yet used it in the sense we mean here.
See, e.g., Official Website of the Chinese Olympic Committee, The "Two Chinas" Problem (Mar.
27, 2004), http://en.olympic.cn/china-oly/history/2004-03-27/12181 l.html.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM
(2004).
13. See infra Part I.B.
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prioritized it accordingly. China is likely to balk at any international
agreement that might imperil this growth.
Second, as a result of its growth-driven delegation of power, the CCP
suffers from a surprising (for such a centralized government) erosion of
state capacity: the provinces often ignore the central government's di-
rectives, frequently without meaningful consequences. 14 The political
structure of the CCP and the institutional structure of China's govern-
ment are sometimes overlapping or redundant and, in many places, lack
effective vertical or horizontal accountability. The environmental regu-
latory agencies are often subordinate to the very agencies they are in-
tended to regulate. Province-level CCP officials are often evaluated
(both locally and in Beijing) by their ability to produce high levels of
economic growth, not their commitment to environmental protection.
Although the CCP has recently tried to recentralize power and rational-
ize the governance structure, 15 the center's capacity to enforce environ-
mental regulations on the provinces is much weaker than in a typical in-
dustrialized state. The existing structural relationship between the
provinces and Beijing often results in a chronic inability on the part of
the CCP to provide public goods like environmental protection, an ina-
bility it will not be able to reverse without incurring substantial costs.
Finally, there is reason to believe that the vast majority of economic
and scientific projections have substantially underestimated China's fu-
ture carbon emissions by failing to account for heterogeneity among
provinces. Eastern China is already highly industrialized and reasonably
wealthy; there is every reason to expect that it will begin to move to-
wards cleaner technologies and shift economic production away from
industry and towards services (which are generally less energy and car-
bon-intensive). 16 Western China, by contrast, is poorer and more agra-
rian, and the typical development pattern for such an area involves a
shift towards greater industrialization and higher per capita energy con-
sumption (and carbon production). Indeed, this is precisely the direction
in which Western China is moving.
17
Every quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions-save for two im-
portant exceptions-uses only national-level data, a methodological
weakness that can wash out distinctions between East and West. Of the
14. See MINXIN PEI, CHINA'S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL
AUTOCRACY (2006).
15. See DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND
THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 229-39 (2004).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part I.B-C.
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two studies that employ sub-national data, one projects higher emissions
than any of the national-level studies; the other projects much higher
emissions than any other study.18 We read this as suggesting that Chi-
nese carbon emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be
significantly greater than the standard models have anticipated, with
correspondingly higher costs to China from any agreement to curb car-
bon emissions. In light of the importance of economic growth to the
CCP, the internal structure of Chinese governance, and the need to de-
velop Western China, the prospects for China choosing to join such an
agreement in the immediate future seem slim.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the general im-
portance of economic growth to the CCP, the distribution of growth
within China, and the social and economic difficulties generated by the
CCP's hyper-growth policies. Part II analyzes the CCP's internal envi-
ronmental enforcement capacity and argues that China would encounter
substantial domestic challenges in implementing a climate accord, even
if it chooses to sign one. Part III critiques the assumptions underlying
quantitative forecasts of Chinese carbon emissions and suggests that fu-
ture emissions may exceed conventional projections by substantial mar-
gins. Part IV canvasses extant potential frameworks for an international
climate change agreement and argues that they are likely to be unsuita-
ble to one or more of the relevant parties. Our conclusion is a pessimis-
tic one: it will be difficult to convince China to join a meaningful inter-
national climate agreement in the near future under the best of
circumstances. The Two Chinas, coupled with China's internal political
dynamics, present circumstances that are hardly ideal.
I. THE CHINESE GROWTH IMPERATIVE
Modern China has reinvented itself on a foundation of kudzu-like
economic growth. Where Marxism once served as the unifying national
ideology, the CCP has substituted wealth generation and prosperity as
the touchstones of the regime and suggested that the Chinese people
judge the legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases in their own standards
of living. Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has al-
so been highly uneven. Eastern, coastal provinces have become wealthy,
while central and western provinces have lagged far behind. In effect,
there is no longer simply "China." There is now Eastern China, which is
urban, industrialized, and relatively prosperous, and Western China,
18. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
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which is rural, agrarian, and relatively poor. This divergence in econom-
ic outcomes-a divergence that in places coincides with pre-existing
ethnic and religious fault lines-poses a serious threat to social stability
within China.' 9 In response, the CCP has begun an aptly named "West-
ern Development Program" in an attempt to prioritize economic growth,
encourage national integration, and curb nationalist unrest in Western
provinces. Accordingly, the governing regime will be reluctant to join a
climate agreement that might contribute to greater instability by stunting
crucial economic development in Western China.
A. Foundations of CCP Rule: Economic Growth
Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic CCP, domi-
nated by Chairman Mao's conception of Marxism and designed to bring
"socialist glory" to China while preserving party rule. After the Cultural
Revolution and Mao's death in 1976, however, the CCP, led by Deng
Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological foundation
that served as the legitimating discursive force for CCP authority.
20
Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward communism and
questions about its efficacy as the governing regime,2' the CCP turned
to two new sources of authority and legitimacy to galvanize support
among the populace and strengthen its hold on power. The first of these
was a new Chinese nationalism. The second was an emphasis on con-
tinued economic growth-a type of "performance legitimacy"22-as a
benchmark and measure of the regime's success.
From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic
protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng and the CCP moved slowly
toward a reform of China's centralized economic policies and internal
governance structure. Deng and some of the reformers began to argue
that the Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technologi-
cal dynamism, and economic efficiency, not more ideology and exces-
sive bureaucracy. To be economically successful, they argued, China
needed the CCP's one-party rule to ensure stability and regain interna-
tional prestige. In the words of one scholar, "[i]n the most fundamental
sense . . . China's economic reform strategy has been guided by a stra-
19. See infra Part I.B.2.
20. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 130.
21. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CCP was facing a population tired of ideological
campaigns, the famine brought on by the Great Leap Forward, the collectivization of agriculture,
the focus on heavy industrialization, and the overbearing bureaucracy of the state. See id.
22. This term was first coined by Samuel Huntington. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 106 (1996).
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tegic vision at the top of the political system. This vision links China's
security, global influence, and domestic stability to the state of its econ-
omy. 23 Sustained economic growth is paramount for the continuation
of the CCP, the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, and the pur-
suit of China's national interests in international politics.
24
The CCP's reform strategy has been marked by incremental opening
of the domestic economy, beginning with agriculture in the late 1970s
and continuing through China's accession to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001 .25 During the 1980s, the CCP delegated a signifi-
cant amount of authority from the central government to the provinces
and cities, freeing local actors-province and city-level officials-to
develop policies that encouraged economic growth independent of the
center.2 6 After a temporary delay in reforms after Tiananmen Square,
the 1990s saw the CCP commit to the creation of a market system, the
privatization of some state-owned enterprises, and the development of
the private sector. At the turn of the century, the CCP began to embrace
private entrepreneurs and "retreat from economic administration to eco-
nomic regulation as the core economic function of government. 2a
From a national perspective, the CCP's economic reforms are an un-
qualified success. Fueled by these reforms, the Chinese economy has
produced tremendous economic growth and a rapidly improving stan-
dard of living for many of China's citizens (in addition to severe conse-
quences for the environment). Between 1978 and 2000, "[o]verall per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant yuan roughly qua-
drupled., 28 Today, China has the world's second largest economy by
purchasing power parity, surpassing Japan, India, and Germany.29 It has
the world's largest foreign capital reserves. ° It enjoys a trade surplus of
23. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 246.
24. See, e.g., Evan Osnos, Angry Youth, NEW YORKER, July 28, 2008, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/28/080728fa fact osnos (quoting one student ac-
tivist, "Chinese people have begun to think, One part is the good life, another part is democra-
cy .... If democracy can really give you the good life, that's good. But, without democracy, if
we can still have the good life why should we choose democracy?" and noting that "prosperity,
computers, and Westernization have not driven China's young e1ite toward tolerance but, rather,
persuaded more than a few of them to postpone idealism as long as life keeps improving.").
25. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 248.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 249.
28. Id. at 246.
29. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity),
in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2009), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2001 rank.html.
30. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, China: Economy, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2009),
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$163.3 billion with the United States.3' It is a leading destination for
foreign direct investment, 32 and has become more integrated into the
world economy through its membership in the WTO. By almost every
economic measure, the CCP's economic policies and drive for moderni-
zation have produced tremendous aggregate gains for China and its citi-
zens.
The CCP's policies have also created a consumer society in the for-
merly Marxist China. From telephones to televisions, newspapers to the
internet, and automobiles to overseas travel, the CCP has brought to the
Chinese people access to information, goods, and technology that were
unimaginable during the Maoist era.33 The CCP's economic policies
have reduced the role of the state in the affairs of daily life, leaving or-
dinary citizens more free to engage in social and economic activities. In
so doing, the CCP has reinforced the norm that prioritizing hyper-
growth polices and ensuring economic development are the party's
overriding responsibilities. China is hardly unique in favoring continued
economic growth; there are few nations on earth that are not attempting
to grow their economies and produce wealth for their citizens. In China,
however, economic growth is not merely a matter of policy. Growth,
particularly in certain geographic regions, is viewed by the CCP as a po-
litical imperative, integral to the regime's survival. As subsequent dis-
cussion will demonstrate, this focus on economic growth significantly
impacts the CCP's incentives to curb environmental degradation and re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions.
B. The Two Chinas
Although China as a whole has done very well over the past two dec-
ades, the gains from its exponential economic growth have not been
evenly divided. A set of early regulatory decisions by the CCP, coupled
with pre-existing national advantages, have allowed the eastern, coastal
regions of the country to industrialize quickly and generate substantial
wealth while leaving the central and western provinces behind. As a re-
sult, "China" is itself something of a misnomer. There are in fact Two
Chinas: wealthy, urban, and industrialized Eastern China, and poorer,
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publicaions/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
31. Jane Macartney, China's Trade Surplus Hits Record $262bn, TIMES ONLINE (London),
Jan. 11, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article3170428.ece.
32. Olena Havrylchyk & Sandra Poncet, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Reward or Re-
medy?, 30 WORLD ECON. 1662, 1662 (2007).
33. PEI, supra note 14, at 2.
[Vol. 50:2
HeinOnline  -- 50 Va. J. Int'l L. 334 2009-2010
THE "Two CHINAS" PROBLEM
rural, and comparatively agrarian Western China. The CCP has taken
steps to address the growing inequalities between West and East, most
prominently through a "Western Development Program" meant to inject
powerful economic stimuli into the lagging western provinces. Howev-
er, the CCP's efforts have not yet borne fruit, and the party faces the
possibility of substantial social and ethnic unrest if it is unable to raise
standards of living in Western China to the levels currently enjoyed in
the East.
1. Growth and Inequality
Despite (or perhaps because of) China's remarkable economic suc-
cess, growth has not come evenly or consistently. 34 In the early years of
economic reform, the CCP focused its economic efforts on the eastern,
coastal provinces at the expense of the central and western provinces. In
1980, China created four special economic zones in the eastern provinc-
es of Guangdong and Fujian, followed by the opening of fourteen coast-
al cities to foreign direct investment and international trade in 1984.35
As one scholar noted, "[t]hese special economic zones and coastal open
areas acquired considerable autonomy, enjoyed superior tax treatments,
and received preferential resource allocations. 36 By the late 1980s,
China had extended the special policies to all coastal regions through its
Coastal Area Development Strategy. 37 The CCP opened the western
provinces to foreign direct investment in 1994 and enacted a new reve-
nue-sharing agreement designed in part to funnel more money to the
West, but the East's head start already was too great: by 1998, govern-
ment spending in the West had fallen to 83% of the national per capita
average while government spending in the East was 130% of the na-
tional per capita average. 38 Moreover, the least efficient businesses-the
state owned enterprises-were disproportionately located in the western
provinces. 39
This distribution of regulatory benefits has led to highly uneven eco-
nomic growth and profound economic and social inequities. 40 The east-
34. See YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA (2003).
35. Dennis Tao Yang, What Has Caused Regional Inequality in China?, 13 CHINA ECON.
REv. 331, 333 (2002).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Hongyi Harry Lai, China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementa-
tion, and Prospects, 28 MOD. CHINA 432, 439 (2002).
39. Id. at 443.
40. CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark
20101
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em Chinese provinces, which were the original focus of Chinese eco-
nomic liberalization, now account for a highly disproportionate percen-
tage of China's economic growth and foreign direct investment and
have benefited from greater infrastructure development, access to for-
eign technologies, and greater economic freedom in the private sector.4'
Thus, the CCP's polices have created Eastern China, with high levels of
economic growth and rising incomes, and Western China, with lower
levels of both. Technically, China consists of twenty-two provinces, five
autonomous regions, four municipalities and two special administrative
regions: Hong Kong and Macau. (We focus here on mainland China and
exclude Hong Kong and Macau.) Though we recognize the administra-
tive distinctions among the different political divisions, for ease of dis-
cussion we refer to autonomous regions and municipalities as "provinc-
es" as well. Therefore, based on both geographic proximity and
economic inequalities, we define Western China as encompassing fif-
teen provinces 42 with a total population of 554.5 million people;43 East-
ern China includes the remaining sixteen provinces" with a population
of 728 million people.45 Figure 1 displays the Chinese provinces on a
map; provinces in Western China are labeled with dots.
Selden eds., 2d ed. 2003).
41. AZIZUR RAHMAN KHAN & CARL RISKIN, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN CHINA IN THE
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2001).
42. These are Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi,
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, and Chongqing.
43. See All China Data Center, China Data Online, http://www.chinadataonline.org/ (follow
"Provincial Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Population and Employment" hyperlink, then fol-
low "Population" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
44. These are Anhui, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Jilin, Shanxi, Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hai-
nan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang.
45. See All China Data Center, supra note 43. China has a total population of approximately
1.3 billion. NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2008),
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm (expand "Population"; follow 3-1
"Population and Its Composition").
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FIGURE 1: EASTERN AND WESTERN CHINESE PROVINCES
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While not every province in Western China is poor, as a group the
Western provinces trail the Eastern provinces severely along several
economic dimensions. Per capita GDP is 9,967 yuan in Western China
and nearly double that in Eastern China, at 19,813 yuan.46 A number of
the Eastern provinces have achieved levels of wealth that exceed those
in Western China by even more startling margins. For example, Tianjin
has a per capita GDP of 35,783 yuan, with Beijing at 45,443 yuan and
Shanghai at 51,474 yuan.47 Put another way, although Western China
accounts for over 40% of China's total population, it contributes just
29% of China's total GDP (approximately 5.7 trillion yuan of a total
19.8 trillion yuan).48 Figure 2 lists the Chinese provinces by per capita
GDP; provinces in Western China are denoted by darker lines.
46. Id. By way of reference, the exchange rate at this writing was approximately seven yuan
to the U.S. dollar. See Bloomberg Currency Calculator, http://www.bloomberg.com/invest/
calculators/currency.htlnl (convert "US DOLLAR (USD)" into "CHINA RENMINBI (CNY)").
47. NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, supra note 45.
48. Id.
DyZ3 n
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FIGURE 2: CHINESE PROVINCES BY PER CAPITA GDP (YUAN/PERSON)
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These GDP discrepancies are also reflected in the amount of invest-
ment by the state in these regions. The Chinese government spends only
54% as much per capita in Western China as it does in Eastern China,
(approximately 1083 yuan per person in the West versus 1992 yuan per
person in the East).49 China's accession to the WTO and the increasing
internationalization of the Chinese economy have only contributed to
rising income inequality. 50
49. Id. This stark divide in state spending indicates that the majority of Chinese governmental
revenue generation and spending takes place at the local or provincial level, not at the national
level. If the opposite were true, the central Chinese government would have the capacity to ad-
dress these inequalities through targeted national spending. See infra Part II.
50. KHAN & RiSKIN, supra note 41. Compared to the Western provinces, Eastern China has
benefitted from greater investment in infrastructure, increased access to advanced technologies
and higher levels of provincial government spending, making Eastern China especially well-
positioned to take advantage of the WTO's liberalization of international trade. This has contri-
buted to income inequality between the already wealthier East and the poorer West. The National
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Worse still, these economic disparities coincide with combustible
ethnic and religious divisions. Western China contains the bulk of Chi-
na's fifty-six minority groups, including nationalist-driven separatist
movements in Tibet and among Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang province. 5'
Not coincidentally, Eastern China is much more homogenous, and the
majority of its residents are ethnic Han Chinese, who constitute nearly
90% of China's population. 52 The CCP has reason to worry that without
economic growth in the West, some minority groups may rise up to
challenge its governing authority. The CCP's response has been to in-
vest in Western China with the intention of reducing income inequality
and addressing social instability, although its efforts have, thus far,
come in fits and starts.
2. The Western Development Program and the Potential for Social
Unrest
In the late 1990s, in response to the festering economic inequities de-
scribed above, the CCP launched a widespread economic initiative to
spur growth in Western China. This Western Development Program
(WDP) was designed both to incentivize economic growth in the
West-ameliorating the disparity between wealthy Eastern and poorer
Western provinces-and to speed the integration of those provinces'
non-Han minority groups into Chinese society. 53 The WDP concentrates
on twelve western provinces representing approximately 365 million
people, or about 30% of China's population.54 (In our delineation of
Western China, we add three additional provinces-Hunan, Henan, and
Hubei-which are economically similar and geographically adjacent to
Bureau of Statistics of China estimates that, as of 2007 (six years after China joined the WTO),
the western provinces remain behind the eastern provinces on many important economic meas-
ures: per capita annual income, per capita urban household income, and urban and rural consump-
tion. NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, supra note 45.
51. SUISHENG ZHAO, A NATION-STATE BY CONSTRUCTION: DYNAMICS OF MODERN
CHINESE NATIONALISM 199-208 (2004). These separatist movements have already proven them-
selves to be potentially very explosive; one week before the start of the Olympics, Uighur Mus-
lims were blamed for an attack that killed sixteen Chinese police officers. See Chinese Border
Assault Kills 16, BBC NEWS, Aug. 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7540138.stm.
52. ZHAO, supra note 51, at 197; see infra Part I.B.2.
53. See David S.G. Goodman, The Campaign to "Open Up the West": National, Provincial-
Level and Local Perspectives, 178 CHINA Q. 317, 319 (2004).
54. See Barry J. Naughton, The Western Development Program, in HOLDING CHINA
TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA 253, 255-56
(Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004) (stating that Xinjiang, Guangxi, Tibet, Guizhou,
Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, and Chongqing constituted
the initial focus of the WDP).
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those encompassed by the WDP.) As part of the WDP, the CCP has fo-
cused on building infrastructure, promoting sustainable growth, and de-
veloping human capital." WDP spending amounted to 130 billion yuan
(equivalent to approximately 1.5% of China's GDP) in 2000 and 2001.56
The success of the WDP is of crucial importance to the CCP, and not
only for economic reasons. For the party, development in Western Chi-
na is a political imperative as well. As the CCP clearly understands, the
emergence of poorer classes may render the governing regime more
vulnerable to pressure for democratization if it cannot address the un-
derlying causes of income inequality. Moreover, the CCP's political
problem-which is, at some level, the problem that any industrialized
economy that generates winners and losers must confront-is exacer-
bated due to three phenomena particular to China.
First, the increasing divergence in standards of living between East-
ern and Western China has been accompanied by the breakdown of the
social safety net provided by the Maoist-era state.57 This has left many
in Western China without proper access to health care, unemployment
compensation, or housing.58 These problems have been compounded by
the fact that the CCP expects local governments to provide education,
social welfare, and health benefits, further worsening the situation for
those in the poorest provinces. 59 The result has been the rise of a "New
Left '60 discourse about social justice and mistrust of market forces. As
one scholar pungently described, "popular discontent with rising in-
equality, unfair income distribution, and rampant corruption has made
parts of Chinese society volatile cesspools of potential instability." 61 At
the same time, the CCP must balance the need to ensure social stability
55. See Lai, supra note 38, at 439, 442.
56. See Naughton, supra note 54, at 267-68.
57. See PEI, supra note 14, at 178 ("Because local officials are more likely to get promoted
for delivering short-term high growth rates or other forms of tangible results, off-budget revenue
tends to be spent on building local industries and other projects that contribute little to improve-
ments in education, health, or the environment.").
58. See Naughton, supra note 54, at 259 ("Poverty alleviation is de facto a regional policy,
because 62 percent of designated poor counties are in the twelve WDP provinces. In the West, 37
percent of the rural population lives in designated poor counties, compared with 17 percent in the
rest of China.").
59. See Era Dabla-Norris, Issues in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China, at 3-4 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/05/30, 2005).
60. See generally JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSITION (2001).
61. Dali L. Yang, Economic Transformation and Its Political Discontents in China: Authori-
tarianism, Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of Political Development, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
143, 153 (2006).
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with providing high rates of growth for elites. Regional disparities, eco-
nomic inequality, social instability, and class conflicts raise the possibil-
ity of a new "revolutionary struggle" if the CCP is "unable to bring in-
come redistribution to a point that is satisfactory to the lower classes
without disillusioning the entrepreneurial class and other well-to-do so-
cial strata and thereby hampering growth in the economy."
62
Second, the East-West economic divide manifests itself as an urban-
rural schism as well:63 the vast majority of job and wealth creation has
occurred in urban areas. This has produced a floating population, esti-
mated at one-hundred million Chinese, that has left the rural areas to
pursue economic opportunities (mostly in the coastal cities).64 The pop-
ulation exodus has placed greater stress on the CCP to either improve
economic conditions in the rural areas and the West (via the WDP) 65 to
slow the flow of migrants or fund the coastal regions' absorption of un-
skilled labor migrating from the West. These forces generate a vicious
cycle: the CCP's economic policies favoring the eastern provinces en-
courage migration to those provinces, requiring additional investment to
maintain high levels of growth.
Finally, as we noted briefly in the previous section, Western China
contains a number of ethnic separatist movements that might challenge
the CCP. The party has already struggled in dealing with pro-
independence activities in Tibet, and it has reason to fear that the fifty-
six non-Han minority groups represented in (mostly Western) China
might push for self-determination. 66 For instance, Uighur separatists in
the Xinjiang province-an area rich with mineral resources67-are in-
creasingly aligning themselves with Islamic fundamentalist move-
ments.68 It is hard to overstate the significance of these types of pros-
pects for unrest in a developing state dependent on natural resources for
62. An Chen, Rising Class Politics and Its Impact on China's Path to Democracy, 10
DEMOCRATIZATION 141, 151 (2003).
63. See Dennis Tao Yang, Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China, 89
AM. ECON. REV. 306, 306 (1999).
64. See generally Li ZHANG, STRANGERS IN THE CITY: RECONFIGURATIONS OF SPACE,
POWER, AND SOCIAL NETWORKS WITHIN CHINA'S FLOATING POPULATION (2001) (arguing that
the creation of migrant housing and marketplaces among the floating population has resulted in a
new spatial and social production to challenge state control).
65. See Goodman, supra note 53, at 318, 327.
66. See Lai, supra note 38, at 446 ("Even though the western region is home to only 23% of
the nation's total population, it accounts for 56% of the nation's ethnic minorities, who constitute
a significant share of the population in several provinces: 94% in Tibet, 61% in Xinjiang, and
35% in Ningxia and Qinghai."); see also ZHAO, supra note 51, at 199-208.
67. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 327 (providing data on Chinese natural resources).
68. Lai, supra note 38, at 446 (describing the causes and consequences of this alignment).
2010]
HeinOnline  -- 50 Va. J. Int'l L. 341 2009-2010
342 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
much of its growth: "The western region contains more than half the na-
tion's reserves in 13 of the 45 main minerals ... [and] 80% of the na-
tion's potential hydropower and 58% of the nation's natural gas re-
serves."
69
For the CCP, it is a cruel twist of fate that economic growth appears
to have simultaneously legitimated its rule in the East and incubated its
foremost political challenges in the West. Failure to address these issues
may yet produce severe social instability, to be followed by calls for
greater social justice, rule of law, and perhaps even pressure for demo-
cratization.
C. Political Imperatives and International Agreements
The short answer to the problems raised in the foregoing sections is
that the world must simply pay China to join a global climate agree-
ment-and that it must pay China enough that it can afford to continue
subsidizing growth in the West.70 A number of scholars have already,
quite correctly, suggested a regime of side payments, though without
any reference to the particular issues generated by China's East-West
divide.7' As an initial matter, we suggest that the internal costs to China
of joining an international agreement-and the amount China will have
to be compensated-are significantly larger than previously believed.
However, we suspect that the importance of Western development to
China's political future will make the CCP even more reluctant to join
an international climate agreement than this cost-benefit calculus alone
would predict. There are two reasons for our pessimism, and they relate
to the availability of information regarding the costs China faces as it
endeavors to raise standards of living in the West.
First, it may well be that the CCP is genuinely uncertain 72 of the cost
of rapid Western growth-or, put another way, that it is uncertain how
much carbon Western China will have to emit over the coming years in
order to industrialize rapidly and inexpensively. 73 For that matter, the
69. Id. at 445.
70. We address questions regarding the shape of an international agreement at a greater level
of generality in Part IV infra.
71. See, e.g., STEWART & WIENER, supra note 5; Sunstein, supra note 5.
72. We use "uncertain" here in the colloquial sense, rather than the Knightian sense, to mean
that China can at least assign a range of probabilities to these costs. See generally FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). The problems we describe here become even
more intractable if true Knightian uncertainty exists.
73. China has argued-rather implausibly, as Cass Sunstein notes-that it cannot sign a cli-
mate treaty because it does not yet know its own level of emissions. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 5
n.20; Daniel Pruzin, China 'Will Not Accept' Emissions Limits; Government Advisor Cites Insuf-
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CCP may not know what level of wealth or development Western China
will demand. The target is likely to move, with Eastern China serving as
some sort of benchmark. 74 This is an issue about which the CCP is like-
ly to be highly risk averse: far better, from its perspective, for the nation
to suffer slightly in the net than for the CCP to join a climate accord that
provides too few economic benefits and results in stunted growth in the
West. For CCP officials who need not fear being voted out of office, the
possibility of social upheaval in the West may represent the greatest ex-
tant political threat. Thus, the CCP will likely demand a substantial
premium to bear this risk, a premium beyond what the United States and
the European Union are willing to pay.
75
Second, information regarding the costs and benefits of generating
economic growth in Western China may not be equally available to all
sides to a climate negotiation. Even given the uncertainty we describe
above, the CCP possesses much better information regarding the val-
ue-both economic and political--of ameliorating the standard of living
in Western China than does the United States or the European Union.
Without this information, other nations cannot know whether China's
demands for compensation are legitimate or mere posturing, and negoti-
ations are more likely to stall as each side engages in hard bargaining
and attempts to negotiate a more favorable agreement. 76 If the costs and
benefits of a global climate agreement were entirely measurable in fuel
costs, negotiations might not be simple, but they would at least be
ficient Data, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 130, at A-2 (July 9, 2007). This is hard to believe as it
pertains to current emissions; a number of other people appear to have quite a good read on cur-
rent Chinese carbon outputs. See, e.g., Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr. [CDIAC], Global, Re-
gional, and National Fossil-Fuel Emissions, http://cdiac.oml.gov/trends/emis/overview.html (last
visited Dec. 17, 2009). But China's rather preposterous stance may conceal a grain of truth. It
may simply be the case that China does not know how much it will "need" to emit in the coming
years, and thus cannot accurately gauge its own self-interest in a global agreement.
74. Studies have shown that individuals care more about relative wealth-their wealth in
comparison to their neighbors or peer group-than they do about their own absolute wealth. See
Ed Diener & Carol Diener, The Wealth of Nations Revisited: Income and Quality of Life, 36 SOC.
INDICATORS RES. 275, 284 (1995) (finding variations in the relationship between GDP and quali-
ty-of-life variables); Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Po-
sition, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 337-39 (2001) (discussing the importance of relative position in
self-reported happiness levels); Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A
Survey on Positional Concerns, 37 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 373-74 (1998) (finding that
most people prefer higher relative income to higher absolute income).
75. See infra Part IV.B.
76. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
303-08 (3d ed. 2001); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89-
91 (2004); John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 45, 100-01 (1993).
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straightforward. By injecting local politics into the equation, the eco-
nomic and ethnic schism between Western China and Eastern China
holds the potential to complicate matters.
II. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND CHINA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REGIME
If an international climate accord is to succeed in curbing warming,
China must be a participating member. 77 China's willingness to partici-
pate is contingent upon both its aggregate self-interest, as others have
noted,78 and its internal political dynamics, as we argue above.79 Yet the
obstacles to Chinese involvement in an international emissions reduc-
tion regime do not end there. China's ability to participate in such a re-
gime is also crucially contingent upon its capacity to enforce such a re-
gime internally.
For any observer familiar with the governments of the United States
or the nations of Western Europe, it is natural to take the national gov-
ernment's ability to dictate terms to states and localities for granted. The
United States operates under a federal system of government that in-
volves the divestiture of significant governing authority to the states,8 °
and yet there is no reason to doubt the power of the national government
to enter into and enforce a climate treaty. The continued operational
success of the Environmental Protection Agency stands as evidence of
this fact. This is not, however, the case for China. Paradoxically for an
autocratic state with a historically centralized economy, China suffers
from a significant erosion of state capacity, coupled with substantial
province-by-province collective action problems. Barring reform and
reconstitution of its administrative apparatus, the CCP will likely have a
tremendous amount of difficulty enforcing emissions curbs or collecting
77. See sources cited supra note 5 (suggesting that an accord cannot succeed with China).
78. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 4, 11 (arguing that China will not join any agreement
that does not further its own national interest).
79. See supra Part I.
80. Most Western European nations are even more centralized than the United States. For in-
stance, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have centralized national governments with-
out corresponding state structures and vest considerably greater authority in their national legisla-
tures and executives. See Daniel J. Elazar, Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems, 18 INT'L
POL. SCI. REv. 237, 238-43 (1997) (comparing the unitary governments of France and the United
Kingdom with the federal model of the United States); Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal
Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 199-200 (2000) (finding that devolutions of authority in
France, Spain, and the United Kingdom do not create subnational polities); cf Daniel J. Elazar,
From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift, 25 PUBLIUS 5, 11 (1995) (describing a trend to-
ward even greater centralization through federations such as the European Union).
[Vol. 50:2
HeinOnline  -- 50 Va. J. Int'l L. 344 2009-2010
THE "Two CHINAS" PROBLEM
carbon taxes in the provinces, particularly those in Western China. Ac-
cordingly, a global climate agreement will appear unattractive to a Chi-
na that could well find itself, as a nation, in violation of such an agree-
ment in ways that it may not be able to control.
A. The Weaknesses of Central Environmental Regulation
China's capacity to implement a climate change agreement depends
heavily upon the central (national) government's ability to coerce local
and provincial officials and private actors into compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations. Surprisingly, for a communist state, China's cen-
tral government suffers from several limitations on its authority. Despite
the center's efforts to assert control over regulatory institutions, 81 the
financial sector, and revenue collection, central ministries still face sig-
nificant obstacles to exerting authority over provincial officials, and to
holding influence over the center's taxing and spending apparatus.82 The
problem is only exacerbated for China's environmental agencies, which
often find themselves subordinate to the very government bureaus and
industries they are meant to regulate. Worse still, these problems exist
within the context of rampant corruption, particularly at the local level.
In the presence of these myriad weaknesses, the CCP cannot be certain
of its ability to bend the provinces to its regulatory will.
1. The Erosion of Central Control
Like other communist nations, China's government is run by the
Communist Party apparatus, with offices of central administration lo-
cated in Beijing. This central administration consists of a variety of
overlapping legislative and executive bodies: the Party Congress, the
Central Committee, the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Commit-
tee, and the various national ministries. 83 Much like American states,
China's various provinces, centrally administered cities (such as Beijing
and Shanghai), and special autonomous regions possess their own,
largely autonomous, regional governments.8 4 Although there are some
81. See Yang, supra note 61, at 146-48.
82. See PEI, supra note 14, at 141-44 (arguing that the fiscal and administrative decentraliza-
tion that took place during the early reform period "jointly created powerful incentives for local
authorities to adopt predatory policies and practices," and that recent attempts to recentralize the
fiscal system have had only moderate effects).
83. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 173.
84. For ease of explication, we will refer to the provinces, centrally administered cities, and
autonomous regions all as "provinces."
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slight variations, each province also contains separate city, county, and
township village governments.
Each central government ministry has an office at almost every level
of government, ranging from central authority in Beijing to remote
township villages, which are the lowest level of governance in the Chi-
nese system. For example, the State Environmental Protection Agency
(SEPA) is based in the central administration (in Beijing) and has an
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) or Environmental Protection
Office at the headquarters of the Fujian provincial government, and
within almost every city, district, county, and township village within
Fujian.85 This basic structure applies to the 29 ministries in each of Chi-
na's 31 provinces and their corresponding cities, districts, counties, and
township villages. Figure 3 describes this organizational system in
graphical form.
85. Abigail R. Jahiel, The Organization of Environmental Protection in China, 156 CHINA Q.
757, 758-59 (1998).
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FIGURE 3: CHINA's ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY APPARATUS 86
(E: Defunct Agency
Regional Government Unit
- Leadership Relationship
---- Advisory Relationship
*Previously called the Natia al Eaviromnnental
Protection Agency (NEPA)
*The future of these commtssions is in question.
This structure conveys the appearance of top-down, hierarchical con-
trol, but the reality is quite to the contrary. Rather, "all territorial units
with the rank of province are formally equal in rank to each other and to
the central government ministries... [and] none of these units can issue
binding orders to any others."87 Out of necessity, then, the central gov-
ernment relies on cooperative, as opposed to coercive, relationships
with the provinces to achieve its economic and political goals. Before
86. Id. at 760.
87. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 180 (emphasis added).
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1994, local governments were entirely responsible for collecting not on-
ly their own taxes, but also the taxes that funded the central govern-
ment.88 As Chinese economic growth exploded, this tax collection struc-
ture created huge incentives for corruption at the province, city, and
township level. Though the post-1994 reforms have restructured the tax
collection process,89 the provinces and localities-the engines of Chi-
na's hyper-growth policies-have maintained significant leverage vis-A-
vis the central government. 90 As of 1997, provincial and local govern-
ments accounted for over 70% of government expenditures in China; by
comparison, state and local spending in the United States represents on-
ly 46% of government expenditures. 91 The impact of this decentraliza-
tion is also visible in the substantial disparities in government spending
levels in Eastern and Western China.92 Figure 4 compares China's level
of local expenditures to those of a variety of other nations.
88. Id. at 181.
89. See YANG, supra note 15, at 80 ("[L]ocal authorities are guaranteed a base amount ...
[and] revenue above the base amount is split between central and local governments... at 50:50
for 2002 and 60 percent for the central government in 2003.").
90. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 181.
91. Dabla-Norris, supra note 59, at 5.
92. See All China Data Center, supra note 43; supra text accompanying note 50. Viewed in
this light, China's spending on the WDP is somewhat striking. Western development is a high
priority for the CCP, yet China spends less than $20 billion per year on the program. See Naugh-
ton, supra note 54, at 267-68. For a Chinese central government hampered by a lack of full con-
trol over taxation, however, this represents a substantial outlay.
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FIGuRE 4: LOCAL REVENUES AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES
93
Another small but important example of China's decentralization of
power is visible in its recent economic stimulus package. In November
2008, China announced a $586 billion program to counteract the effects
of the global economic slowdown. However, as the details leaked, Chi-
na publicly acknowledged "that the central government would provide
little more than a quarter" of the planned funding.94 The provinces and
localities were expected to make up the difference. (Imagine the Ameri-
can response if the federal government had announced an $800 billion
stimulus plan that it expected the states to fund using state revenue.)
Even during a global financial crisis, China's central government found
itself dependent upon sub-national authorities to implement its plans.
95
These results compel the counterintuitive conclusion that in many re-
93. Dabla-Norris, supra note 59, at 5 (emphasis added to China row).
94. Geoff Dyer, Doubt Case on Funds for Beijing Boost, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at 9
(emphasis added).
95. Although the provinces later announced a $1.4 trillion package, "few investments an-
nounced by the provinces were new.... [M]ost were either already under construction, had been
under discussion for some time or had been planned but not begun because of a lack of money."
What the Chinese Stimulus Package Means, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-yuan.3.18074260.html.
Share of Subnational Governments
(in percent of total)
Countries Revenues Expenditures
1990 1997 1990 1997
Argentina 38.2 41.1 46.3 43.9
Australia 20.0 22.7 50.9 47.9
China 33.8 48.8 67.4 72.6
Germany 28.9 28.8 40.2 37.8
India 33.0 36.1 51.1 53.3
Indonesia 2.9 2.9 13.1 14.8
Mexico 19.0 20.6 17.8 26.1
Russian Federation ... 40.6 ... 37.6
South Africa 5.5 5.3 20.7 49.8
United States 33.8 32.9 42.0 46.4
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spects, China's central government barely holds the power of the purse
over the provinces.
In addition, China's size makes it extremely difficult to govern cen-
trally. Because many of the provinces have populations greater than fif-
ty million, the central government is forced to delegate substantial re-
sponsibility for social welfare, economic initiatives, and administrative
control to the provincial level, allowing greater flexibility in practice
from province to province. 96 The central government might once have
been able to impose its will upon the periphery through its monopoly on
ideology-local officials and private actors would have been selected
and trained to obey the central government's dictates and to fear the re-
percussions of noncompliance. But the CCP's emphasis on economic
growth above all other priorities has shunted aside whatever ideological
discipline might once have existed and has diminished the center's leve-
rage over private, local, and even provincial activity. 97 The result has
been a dramatic erosion of state capacity:
Although the Chinese state appears to be institutionally uncon-
strained, centralized, and omnipresent, its ability to implement
policy and enforce rules is severely limited by its incoherence,
internal tensions and weaknesses. The phenomenon.., is widely
reported in the Chinese press. It includes the defiance of the cen-
tral government law and policies by the local authorities, the
willful violation of law and regulations by government officials,
and the practice of local protectionisms that has plagued the en-
forcement of contracts, court judgments, and national laws.98
Indeed, the entire thrust of China's post-Mao reforms has been to
shift political, economic, and administrative power from the national
government to the various sub-national authorities, with the goal of "en-
courag[ing] every territorial political body to do its utmost to develop its
local economy fast enough to maintain social and political stability." 99
The CCP has used the lowest levels of government-mostly the cities-
as the engines of its hyper-growth policies, 00 resulting in a substantial
96. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 181.
97. Id.; see also PEI, supra note 14, at 147 (arguing that the focus on economic growth and
decentralization allowed "new administrative powers by the central government but unchecked at
the local level, regional political power bosses were able to establish fiefdoms and gain monopo-
listic power").
98. PEI, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis added).
99. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 181.
100. Id. at 179.
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transfer of political and economic power from the center. l01 It comes as
little surprise that the modem trend has been towards rapid economic
growth at the expense of centralized authority: this was precisely the
government's objective.10 2
2. Of Foxes and Henhouses: China's Environmental Apparatus
Despite China's predominant focus on economic growth, there is no
question that the national government has devoted meaningful attention
to environmental concerns. Yet even at the national level, there exist a
number of structural problems that inhibit aggressive efforts to control
pollution.
Though China's EPBs are tasked with "implement[ing] policies de-
signed by SEPA and [assisting] in drafting local regulations,"'10 3 they
are "heavily dependent" on local and provincial governments to provide
a significant portion of funding for regional EPBs. 10 4 Consequently,
provincial governments hold tremendous power to cut the cord on the
local EPBs if they act contrary to local or provincial interests. This lack
of centralized enforcement capacity would not pose such a severe prob-
lem if provincial and local officials were themselves committed to en-
forcing environmental regulations. Yet that is hardly the case. Local
governments have little incentive to take any action that might slow
economic growth, including addressing any sort of environmental con-
cern (whether dictated by the central government or not). In keeping
with the CCP's nationwide focus on performance legitimacy, local offi-
cials are evaluated primarily on their ability to deliver sustained eco-
nomic growth. As one scholar explains:
The local EPBs are heavily dependent on both the higher level
environmental authorities and on local governments. However,
101. For a discussion of the environmental consequences of Chinese federalism and fiscal and
administrative decentralization, see Gregory H. Fuller, Economic Warlords: How De Facto Fede-
ralism Inhibits China 's Compliance with International Trade Law and Jeopardizes Global Envi-
ronmental Initiatives, 75 TENN. L. REv. 545 (2008).
102. See Yingyi Qian & G6rard Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, 88 AM.
ECON. REv. 1143 (1999). But see Kellee S. Tsai, Off Balance: The Unintended Consequences of
Fiscal Federalism in China, 9 J. CHINESE POL. ScI., Fall 2004, at 7.
103. Jahiel, supra note 85, at 759.
104. Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China's Environmental Governance in Transition, 15
ENVTL. POL. 149, 155 (2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Jahiel, supra
note 85, at 759 ("In all cases . . it is the local government, not the higher levels of the environ-
ment protection apparatus, that provides environmental agencies with their annual budgetary
funds, approves institutional advancements in rank and determines increases in personnel and
even allocation of such resources as cars, office buildings and employee housing.").
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as little importance is given to environmental criteria in assessing
the performance of local governments, they [the local govern-
ments] often display no interest in stringent environmental
reform, yet they play a key role in financing the local EPBs.
There are also poor (financial) incentives for both governments
and private actors to comply with environmental laws, standards
and policies. 
105
Moreover, local officials are not evaluated only by their ostensible
supervisors in Beijing. Even though they are not elected, provincial and
local officials are reliant upon the local interests that they govern and
those interests' continued generation of tax revenues. Provinces and ci-
ties are the primary suppliers of social welfare benefits, education, and
health care'° 6-- recall that 70% of Chinese government spending occurs
at the province and local levels. Local industries are the primary genera-
tor of economic growth, the source of government funding, and the pur-
veyor of employment opportunities. Consequently, provincial officials
have little incentive to take any regulatory action that would diminish
the sources of funds they need to provide social services.
The provincial emphasis on growth also encourages collusion be-
tween local EPB officials and private enterprises to circumvent regula-
tion. 10 7 For instance, local governments have frequently granted tax ab-
atements to private firms when fees from environmental violations start
to harm production, allowing the companies to continue to operate and
pollute.108
Collusion similarly diminishes the central government's ability to
monitor private behavior and environmental compliance in the provinc-
es:' 09 local officials, private entrepreneurs, and local residents have little
reason to produce accurate information on pollution and every incentive
to subvert policies that might interfere with continued high rates of eco-
nomic growth." 0 This effect is strongest where it is most pernicious: in
105. Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 149, 155.
106. See Dabla-Norris, supra note 59, at 4.
107. See Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 155 (noting that local incentive structures result in
"a significant level of collusion between local officials and private enterprises which, 'employ'
them in order to get around strict environmental monitoring").
108. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 283.
109. See generally PEI, supra note 14, at 147 (describing the effects of decentralizated admin-
istrative monitoring).
110. See Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 155 ("[Llocal EPBs are criticised for their poor en-
vironmental capacity (in both qualitative and quantitative terms) and, more generally, for the lack
(and distortion) of environmental information."). Local governments have also colluded to shift
urban waste to poorer rural areas and, unbelievably, some cities have required that chemical corn-
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Western China, where rapid industrialization and economic growth are
fueled by the construction of new, highly polluting coal plants and ce-
ment factories.' "
In addition, even within the central government, the environmental
protection bureaus have historically been embedded in the very minis-
tries that demand the greatest environmental regulation and supervision.
For example, until recently nearly 75% of the EPBs across China were
located within (and were subordinate to) the ministries that they were
expected to regulate." 12 This weakened what little coercive power the
EPBs possessed, particularly in a society with an ethos of high econom-
ic growth. "'
In March 2008, China created a new Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection (MEP) to better address its environmental challenges. However,
it has a staff of only three hundred employees; "[b]y contrast [the U.S.]
EPA has 17,000 employees for a country with less than one-fourth the
population of China."'" 4 And because the MEP has such a small staff
and such limited enforcement powers, "it must rely almost entirely on
its ability to persuade other, more powerful agencies and officials to
act. 1" 5 Thus, "[w]hile the national environmental authority in Beijing
has strengthened its position vis-A-vis other ministries and agencies, this
is not always the case at the local level, where more than incidentally
the EPBs are part of-and thus subservient to-an economic state orga-
nisation.,, 1
6
panies locate downstream so as not to pollute the city's drinking water-shifting the cost of envi-
ronmental degradation to the next city downstream. See Jahiel, supra note 85, at 780.
111. See supra Part I.B.2.
112. Jahiel, supra note 85, at 772.
113. As late as 1998, the national and local EPBs lacked "national ministry designation," the
Chinese equivalent of an American agency lacking cabinet-level status. They were subordinate to
both the other national ministries and the province-level governments. As a consequence, "many
other ministries effectively control parts of the environmental agenda, resulting in competing
priorities and lack of discipline and coordination. The Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry
of Agriculture, and urban construction bureaus, for example, all dominate[d] parts of the envi-
ronmental agenda." LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 283. For a more in-depth discussion, see Ja-
hiel, supra note 85, at 759.
114. Robert V. Percival, The Challenge of Chinese Environmental Law, INT'L ENVTL. L.
COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n, Int'l Envtl. Law Comm., Chicago, Ill.), Aug. 2008, at 2, 4,
available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/intenviron/newsletter/aug8/IELC-AugO8.pdf.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 157; see also Jahiel, supra note 85, at 765.
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3. Corruption and Capacity
The combination of the CCP's high-growth policies and its massive
divestiture of power to the provinces and townships has created strong
incentives for corruption.' 17 China is one of the most corrupt countries
in the world, with "corruption result[ing] in astronomical losses of state
assets estimated at around 50 billion yuan per year." ' 18 Although
"[a]uthoritative Chinese estimates put corruption-related losses of state
revenue at around 4 percent of GDP annually, and corruption-related
capital flight at around 2 percent of GDP,"'1 19 some estimates place the
total value of corruption at approximately 15% of Chinese GDP.1 21 The
recent Chinese earthquake and the collapse of several schools in the Si-
chuan province12 provide tragic evidence of the fact that "in infrastruc-
ture construction alone, corruption is estimated to affect nearly 100 bil-
lion yuan worth of projects a year... [and] has resulted in cost overruns
as well as collapsed buildings, bridges, dams, and losses in lives. 122
The efficacy of the Chinese administrative state, particularly in the en-
forcement and implementation of environmental rules and policies, is
substantially limited by widespread corruption at every level of gover-
nance.
Though the CCP has taken steps to try to address rampant official
corruption, 23 the regulatory bodies charged with monitoring party offi-
cials and rooting out corruption lack the necessary authority and re-
sources to fulfill their responsibilities. The secretary in charge of the
Central Discipline Inspection Commission is subordinate to the CCP's
secretary at both the national and provincial levels. 124 The inspection
teams often consist of "retired senior leaders who have little local know-
ledge and operate in isolation. Their movements and information
sources can be easily controlled by the same provincial leaders they are
supposed to evaluate."1 25 Given the hundreds of thousands of CCP offi-
cials operating across China and the four-to-five month inspection
117. See YAN SUN, CORRUPTION AND MARKET IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 126-28 (2004).
118. YANG, supra note 15, at 219.
119. Yan Sun, Corruption, Growth, and Reform: The Chinese Enigma, 104 CURRENT HIST.
257, 258 (2005).
120. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 199.
121. See generally Jim Yardley, Grief in the Rubble: Chinese Are Left to Ask Why Schools
Crumbled, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at Al (describing the Chinese earthquake, the collapse of
a number of Chinese primary schools, and the political and economic ramifications).
122. YANG, supra note 15, at 219.
123. For a discussion of these steps, see generally id. at 224-48.
124. Id.
125. PEI, supra note 14, at 149.
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process, few provinces can be monitored in a given year. For example,
in 2003, ten provinces received inspections by five inspection teams. 12
6
The same incentive structure that produces local government indiffe-
rence to environmental regulations generates high levels of corruption.
The result is a weakening of the central government's monitoring capac-
ity and a gradual erosion of state capacity.
B. Chinese Collective Action Problems
This combination of weakening central control and self-interested
provincial governments produces a collective action problem among
Chinese provinces. 127 It may well be in the interest of China as a
whole-and in the interests of nearly every province individually-to
impose and enforce meaningful curbs on pollution, particularly as part
of an international agreement that might involve substantial side pay-
ments to China. But within China's current regulatory structure, the cen-
ter lacks the capacity to effectively impose such curbs on all provinces
simultaneously, and it is in the interest of no single province's officials
to act unilaterally and sacrifice the province's own economic growth for
the environmental good of the nation. This is particularly true of restric-
tions on emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, which
are essentially irrelevant if enacted locally and sporadically and only
beneficial if undertaken on a truly international scale.'
28
At the outset, this collective action problem raises the possibility that,
even if China were to sign on to a global climate agreement, it simply
might not be capable of enforcing it internally. 29 If the global agree-
ment involved worldwide taxes on carbon emissions, provincial gov-
ernments might fail to collect those taxes on local industries. If such an
126. Id.
127. Cf Joshua Glasgow, Not in Anybody's Backyard? The Non-Distributive Problem with
Environmental Justice, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 71 (2005) (arguing that minorities and the poor
are unable to overcome environmentally-based collective action problems); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Fed-
eral Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that there is no race-to-
the-bottom collective action problem in general, but describing areas in which federal regulation
would be helpful in curing specific market failures); Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative
Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331, 339-400 (1998) (describing the free
rider problem in the field of international environmental law).
128. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1681 (explaining that even the Kyoto Protocol, because it
does not include nations such as China and India, would have very little effect on global warm-
ing). Sporadic or localized carbon abatement would produce even fewer gains.
129. For a description of the various forms that these sorts of agreements might assume, see
infra Part IV.
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agreement took the form of a cap-and-trade regime, local officials might
refuse to sanction industries that neglected to purchase emissions credits
before polluting. In such a scenario, CCP intentions and worldwide
protestations to the contrary, Chinese emissions would continue to grow
despite the legal ramifications for the country as a whole.
The more likely second-order problem is that the CCP might decline
to join a global climate agreement for fear that it would wind up in vi-
olation of that treaty due to internal forces beyond its control. If the sce-
nario described in the previous paragraph were to arise, and China were
to sign a global climate accord and then fail to live up to its responsibili-
ties, the central government would likely face steep international fines
(or, alternatively, stiff tariffs on valuable exports produced by the prov-
inces of Eastern China) for what amounts to a crime it did not commit.
The result would be to further strengthen the hand of provincial and lo-
cal governments at the expense of China's central administration, hardly
the outcome the CCP would prefer.
The CCP could, of course, solve these structural problems by radical-
ly restructuring the party, the central government, and the administrative
apparatus. It could impose stricter controls on local and provincial offi-
cials; force them to report more directly to superiors in central adminis-
tration; hire and train an enormous cadre of civil servants and dispatch
them to the provinces as tax collectors; or take any number of other ac-
tions to consolidate power in Beijing. Some scholars claim that the CCP
has undertaken precisely this project-gradually and with mixed re-
sults. 130
There is little doubt that the CCP could succeed eventually in such an
endeavor; it is, after all, an autocratic regime, and in the end it would be
able to exert control over the levers of power. However, such measures
would be tremendously costly and would tend to subvert the national
divestment of governing authority that has helped fuel China's econom-
ic rise (and helped preserve the CCP's authority). At minimum, China
would likely demand additional side payments to cover these transition
costs, again inflating the cost of purchasing Chinese participation in a
climate regime beyond what straightforward cost-benefit analyses have
indicated. 13 1
Worse still, information about these costs-much like information
about China's need to develop the Western provinces-is asymmetric:
the United States will have significantly more difficulty than the CCP in
130. See, e.g., YANG, supra note 15; see also Naughton, supra note 54.
131. See infra Part IV.B.
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gauging the costs to the CCP of radically reasserting control over the
provinces. (Contrast this with estimates of the economic impact of
emissions controls on Chinese industry, which rely on data equally
available to all parties.) Again, asymmetric information about relative
bargaining positions can only complicate negotiations, even under the
best of circumstances.' 
32
The idea that an autocratic state known for many years for having a
centrally managed economy could fall prey to diminishing centralized
authority and self-interested local behavior is counter-intuitive, to say
the least. Yet that appears to be exactly what has occurred in China, to
the detriment of its interest in-and ability to join-an international
climate agreement.
III. THE Two CHINAS AND THE PERILS OF BLACK-Box FORECASTING
In the previous Parts, we made three points: first, that while Eastern
China is already highly industrialized and relatively wealthy, Western
China remains comparatively agrarian and poor; second, that the Chi-
nese central government is committed to industrializing the largely rural
West, predominantly out of political necessity; and third, that China will
be especially reluctant-to a degree not previously appreciated-to en-
ter into any carbon emissions control regime that would impinge upon
its ability to industrialize the West, due in large part to the structural dif-
ficulties the central government faces in imposing environmental con-
trols or taxes on the provinces. There, we sought to describe the qualita-
tive barriers to an effective climate agreement with China.
In this Part, we seek to make one additional quantitative point that
stems from the same analysis of China's western growth. Scientists
have constructed a number of mathematical models that attempt to pre-
dict Chinese carbon emissions for the next thirty years based upon data
from prior years. These models again treat China as a unitary nation-a
black box-with a single per capita GDP, a single level of per capita
emissions, and a single demand for economic development and im-
proved air quality.
For the China of the early twenty-first century, this is a poor approx-
imation. As the foregoing Parts make clear, China is not one nation but
two: an industrialized East that has already achieved a fairly high level
of economic prosperity but suffers from significant environmental de-
gradation, and a rural West with significantly lower levels of economic
132. See supra note 76.
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development and pollution. In its simplest possible terms, our argument
is that these Two Chinas will develop very differently over the coming
years. Eastern China will likely move toward cleaner technologies and
lower per capita levels of pollution, while Western China will likely
progress toward greater industrialization and higher per capita levels of
pollution. The vast majority of environmental models ignore regional
variations within the country and assume that the nation, as a whole,
will behave substantially like Eastern China. 133 Consequently, it is like-
ly that they have systematically underestimated the amount of green-
house gas that China will produce over the next several decades-or so
we will argue.
134
Legal scholars and policymakers have relied heavily-appropriately
so-upon these standard models of Chinese emissions in constructing
and evaluating proposed emissions accords. Analyses of Chinese incen-
tives to reach agreement on carbon emissions and of the side payments
to China that might be required before any agreement is possible depend
significantly on these predictive models. And yet the errors in calcula-
tion engendered by this black-boxing of China are not mere trifles that
will require small recalibrations in various projections. Rather, they
represent billions of metric tons of carbon dioxide and thus potentially
hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars in alleviation costs. If we are
correct that China's carbon emissions growth will be significantly
greater than current models predict, the already difficult task of reaching
a workable climate accord becomes even more complicated.
135
The economic models used to predict Chinese emissions rely upon an
explicit-and in some cases quite straightforward-set of assumptions
about the functioning of markets, governments, and people. 136 These as-
133. There are two important exceptions: the 2007 World Energy Outlook, which focuses on
India and China, and a climate model by Maximilian Auffhammer and Richard T. Carson. INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK (2007), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/
nppdf/free/2007/weo_.2007.pdf, Maximilian Auffhammer & Richard T. Carson, Forecasting the
Path of China's C0 2 Emissions Using Province Level Information (Dept. of Agric. & Resource
Econ., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Working Paper No. 971, 2007), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/areucb/971/. These outliers reach divergent results from the standard
models and lend important support to our argument, and we discuss them in some detail below.
134. For reasons that will become evident, the conclusions we offer in this Part are necessari-
ly tentative. With this in mind, and for ease of explication, we will refrain from placing the word
"likely" or "probable" in front of every assertion. The reader, however, should remain cognizant
of the speculative nature of these statements.
135. See Posting of Eric Posner to the University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/12/is-a-climate-tr.html (Dec. 24, 2007, 13:10 CST)
[hereinafter Posner Posting].
136. Our treatment of these models is guided by the approach to climate models (and mathe-
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sumptions are presumably quite sound in the preponderance of situa-
tions, and when applied to the preponderance of countries, but we do
not believe that they are correct as applied to a type of "dual" nation like
the Two Chinas we describe here. We take direct aim at these assump-
tions below.
A. The Environmental Models
1. The IPA T Identity
At its most simplistic level, the quantity of carbon dioxide produced
by a nation's citizens-indeed, the amount of any pollutant produced-
is a function of three factors:
Population. More people will naturally produce more carbon.
Affluence or GDP. Generally speaking, the greater a nation's eco-
nomic production, the greater the quantity of carbon it will generate
in the course of running the factories and machinery that power the
economy (and the more carbon that affluent consumers will produce
in the course of their daily lives).
Technology. Holding other factors equal, as a nation's level of tech-
nology rises, it will find cleaner or more efficient methods of produc-
ing energy, and the amount of carbon generated (holding population
and GDP constant) will decline.
This relationship forms the basis for the foundational equation used
in estimating environmental emissions: 137
(1) I=PxAxT
where I stands for pollution impact (essentially a measure of total
pollution), P is population size, A is affluence (GDP), and T is a meas-
ure of the nation's technology level. As noted above, the assumption
underlying this model is that "pollution should be monotonically in-
creasing in P and A and monotonically decreasing for improvements in
T.,138
matical models generally) suggested in Daniel A. Farber, Climate Models: A User's Guide (Univ.
of Cal., Berkeley, Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 1030607, 2007), available at
http://www.ssm.comlabstract-id=1030607 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of various
types of models and urging legal scholars to engage with them directly).
137. Paul R. Ehrlich & John P. Holdren, Impact of Population Growth, 171 SCIENCE 1212
(1971); John P. Holdren, Commentary, Environmental Degradation: Population, Affluence,
Technology, and Sociopolitical Factors, ENVIRONMENT, July-Aug. 2000, at 4.
138. Aufthammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 3.
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Other scientists have usefully decomposed this relationship into a se-
ries of identities:1
39
(2) 002 Emissions= Population x GDP Energy Carbon
Persin x -- D-- x Energy
The first two terms on the right side of this equation are simply a na-
tion's population and its per capita GDP. The third quantity on the right
side of the equation, energy units per GDP, represents the energy inten-
sity of a country's economy. The fourth, carbon emissions per unit of
energy, describes the degree to which that nation's energy production is
carbon intensive (or "dirty"). Combining these two quantities yields the
equation:
(3) C0 Pla GDP Carbon(3)O2 Emisso = Popultion Person x GDP
Much of the attention and effort in modeling carbon emissions cen-
ters on the final term in this equation. That term, carbon emissions per
unit of GDP, represents the amount of carbon a nation's economy must
generate in order to produce wealth, and is typically known simply as a
nation's "carbon intensity." The contrast between high-carbon intensity
and low-carbon intensity economies can be striking, even to a casual
observer. The United States of the 1920s is a prime example of the for-
mer, characterized by booming industrial production, significant num-
bers of automobiles, and exclusively fossil-fuel powered electrical
plants, all before the advent of fuel injection, smokestack scrubbers, or
the Clean Air Act. In 1920, the United States was producing over 2800
metric tons of carbon dioxide for every million dollars of GDP.
Low carbon intensity economies come in a number of forms, ranging
from, at one end of the spectrum, subsistence agriculture (which pro-
duces low levels of wealth but involves the burning of almost no fossil
fuels) to, at the other end, a high-technology, environmentally conscious
society that produces much of its energy through nuclear or renewable
sources. That would not seem an apt description of the modern-day
United States, but in fact, American carbon intensity in 2004 was a
comparatively judicious 566 metric tons of carbon dioxide for every
139. Christopher Yang & Stephen H. Schneider, Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions Scena-
rios: Sensitivity to Social and Technological Factors in Three Regions, in MITIGATION AND
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 373 (1998); Yoichi Kaya, Impact of Carbon
Dioxide Emission Control on GNP Growth: Interpretation of Proposed Scenarios (Paper pre-
sented to the IPCC Energy and Industry Subgroup, Response Strategies Working Group, Paris,
1990). This relationship is commonly known as the "Kaya Identity" in honor of its originator. Id.
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million dollars of GDP-approximately 1/5 of its peak in the first half
of the twentieth century. 
140
Because of the obvious importance of trends in carbon intensity to
predictions of national emissions growth, economists and climate scien-
tists have focused on the creation of mathematical models that could be
used to forecast this factor or, alternatively (and essentially equivalent-
ly), a nation's per capita carbon emissions.' 41 The approach is quite
straightforward: a forecast of carbon intensity, coupled with some stan-
dard assumptions regarding GDP growth over time, yields predictions
of future carbon emissions. Projections of GDP growth are standard
economic fare; 142 the difficult step in forecasting emissions comes in
finding a way to estimate future carbon intensity. Some divergence in
methodology persists, but all of the leading approaches stem to some
degree from a theory known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve.
2. The Environmental Kuznets Curve
In an influential 1955 paper, the economist Simon Kuznets proposed
that economic inequality in a developing market economy would initial-
ly rise over time-as the nascent markets would heavily favor winners
over losers-but at a certain point would begin to fall as the society
grew wealthier and citizens demanded social welfare and education
programs from the government. 143 Kuznets' theory predicted that a
graph of economic inequality versus per capita income would trace a
parabolic, or inverted U-shaped curve.
140. Calculated from CDIAC, supra note 73.
141. Per capita emissions are simply the product of carbon intensity (carbon emissions per
GDP) and per capita GDP, the final two terms in Equation 3. From that equation it is easy to see
that a forecast of per capita carbon emissions, coupled with forecasts of population growth, yield
predictions of a country's future carbon output.
142. In fact, most emissions projections do not attempt to settle upon a single prediction of
GDP growth, but rather employ a range of possible predictions, in some cases explicitly labeled
as "high-growth," "standard," or "low-growth" predictions. See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY,
supra note 133. The reported figures are usually for the standard, middle predictions.
143. Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1955);
Bruce Yandle, Madhusudan Bhattarai, & Maya Vijayaraghavan, Environmental Kuznets Curves:
A Review of Findings, Methods, and Policy Implications, PERC RESEARCH STUDY 02-1, Apr.
2004, at 2, available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02-la.pdf). Kuznets was awarded the Nobel
Prize in economics for this theory in 1971.
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FIGURE 5: THE KUZNETS CURVE
Income per Capita
In 1991, two economists, Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, sug-
gested for the first time that the Kuznets curve might apply to environ-
mental conditions as well as economic ones. In a series of papers that
began with an attempt to predict the impact of the North American Free
Trade Agreement on air quality, they found that "environmental degra-
dation and income have an inverted U-shaped relationship": 144 as socie-
ties grew richer their pollution levels first increased, until at a certain
level of income they began to decrease. This relationship became
known, appropriately, as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The
income level at which environmental degradation would begin to de-
crease (and environmental conditions improve) as societies invested
greater wealth in environmental protection is the curve's "turning
point."
144. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.
J. EcON. 353, 354 (1995).
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FIGURE 6: THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE 145
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By now, environmental economists have found an inverted-U rela-
tionship between income and a wide variety of measures of air quality,
including concentrations of sulfur dioxide, dark smoke (comprising a
variety of chemical pollutants), 146 carbon monoxide, 147 nitrogen oxide,
and suspended particulate matter.148 Studies have demonstrated the
same relationship between income and water pollutants, including ar-
senic and lead. 149 The evidence regarding carbon dioxide is somewhat
less clear, and substantial academic debate exists as to whether the typi-
cal inverted-U relationship exists between per capita income and a na-
145. Yandle et al., supra note 143, at 3.
146. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American
Free Trade Agreement (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3914, 1991).
147. Thomas M. Seldon & Daqing Song, Environmental Quality and Development: Is There
a Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?, 27 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 147 (1994).
148. M.A. Cole et al., The Environmental Kuznets Curve: An Empirical Analysis, 2 ENV'T &
DEV. ECON. 401 (1997).
149. Grossman & Krueger, supra note 144. The income level at which the EKC turning point
occurs (and environmental conditions begin to improve) is similarly the subject of some debate,
and, perhaps unsurprisingly, economists have found different turning points for different pollu-
tants. As a class, however, air pollutants appear to have EKC turning points between $10,000 and
$30,000 (in 2003 dollars), Cole et al., supra note 148, while water pollutants have slightly lower
turning points, typically between $5000 and $10,000. Grossman & Krueger, supra note 144.
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tion's total CO2 emissions.15  However, a consensus has emerged
among economists that the typical Kuznets relationship does hold be-
tween income and both per capita CO 2 emissions and carbon intensi-
ty-past a certain income level, individuals generate less carbon even if
the nation as a whole does not. 15 1 The history of U.S. carbon intensity
follows just such a pattern.152
FIGURE 7: U.S. CARBON INTENSITY BY YEAR
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In many respects, the theory behind the EKC closely tracks the
theory underlying the original economic Kuznets curve. At very low le-
vels of per capita income, economies are principally agrarian and pro-
duce very little pollution. As a nation industrializes, it consumes natural
resources and emits pollution in the course of producing energy and
goods. Environmental protection is an extremely low priority-the
country has experienced essentially no environmental damage, and eco-
nomic growth is paramount. At a certain point, increases in wealth will
150. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Thomas M. Selden, Stoking the Fires? C0 2 Emissions
and Economic Growth, 57 J. PUB. ECON. 85 (1995); Christoph Martin Lieb, The Environmental
Kuznets Curve and Flow Versus Stock Pollution: The Neglect of Future Damages, 29 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 483 (2004).
151. Theodore Panayotou et al., Compensation for "Meaningful Participation" in Climate
Change Control: A Modest Proposal and Empirical Analysis, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 437
(2002). One study found that the turning point for per capita emissions occurs at approximately
$11,500 per capita (in 1985 dollars). Richard Schmalensee et al., World Carbon Dioxide Emis-
sions: 1950-2050, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 15 (1998).
152. Calculated from CDIAC, supra note 73.
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eventually drive decreases in pollution levels, although there is some-
what less agreement among economists regarding the cause of this re-
versal. Some have hypothesized that environmental quality is a luxury
good that consumers become willing to pay for as levels of wealth in-
crease; 153 others have proposed that environmental improvements are
simply not cost-benefit justified until a society's levels of income and
technology reach a certain point; 154 some suggest that as countries de-
velop their economies shift away from industrial manufacturing and to-
wards comparatively less carbon-intensive service industries; 55 and still
others suggest that wealthy economies create conditions under which
political economies favorable to environmental protection can devel-
op.
156
In light of the empirical evidence supporting this inverted-U beha-
vior' 57-and despite the lack of agreement on its precise causes-the
EKC has been widely adopted as the foundation for models designed to
forecast future pollution emissions. Economists have deployed models
based upon the EKC to predict a variety of environmental conditions,
including "ambient concentrations of [sulfur dioxide], . . . suspended
particulate matter, lack of safe water, lack of urban sanitation, annual
153. John M. Antle & Greg Heidebrink, Environment and Development: Theory and Interna-
tional Evidence, 43 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 603 (1995). This theory predates Gross-
man and Krueger's 1991 working paper. See Grossman & Krueger, supra note 146. According to
Vernon Ruttan:
[Iln relatively high-income economies the income elasticity of demand for commodities
and services related to sustenance is low and declines as income continues to rise, while
the income elasticity of demand for more effective disposal of residuals and for envi-
ronmental amenities is high and continues to rise. This is in sharp contrast to the situa-
tion in poor countries where the income elasticity of demand is high for sustenance and
low for environmental amenities.
Vernon W. Ruttan, Technology and the Environment, 53 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 707, 707-08
(1971).
154. James Andreoni & Arik Levinson, The Simple Analytics of the Environmental Kuznets
Curve, 80 J. PUB. ECON. 269 (2001); Magnus Lindmark, An EKC-Pattern in Historical Perspec-
tive: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Technology, Fuel Prices and Growth in Sweden 1870-1997, 42
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 333 (2002); Mohan Munasinghe, Is Environmental Degradation an Inevita-
ble Consequence of Economic Growth: Tunneling Through the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 29
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 89 (1999).
155. Jean Agras & Duane Chapman, A Dynamic Approach to the Environmental Kuznets
Curve Hypothesis, 28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 267, 274-75 (1999).
156. Jordi Roca, Do Individual Preferences Explain the Environmental Kuznets Curve?, 45
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 3 (2003); Mariano Torras & James K. Boyce, Income, Inequality, and Pollu-
tion: A Reassessment of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 25 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 147 (1998).
157. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
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deforestation, municipal solid waste per capita" and, what is relevant
here, carbon intensity.
1 58
3. EKC Assumptions in Chinese Emissions Models
All of the leading Chinese carbon emissions forecasts-including the
forecasts produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC);159 the Energy Information Administration;' 60 and numerous
other economists and climate scientists'61--employ models based on
Equations 2 and 3 above.' 62 These models combine projections of Chi-
na's future population and economic growth with a variety of assump-
tions about the shape of the Chinese economy, its technological devel-
opment, and the growth in its energy needs. (We refer to these as the
"standard" Chinese emissions models, to contrast them with the outliers
that we will analyze below.) Despite their many varieties,' 63 these mod-
els have generated reasonably consistent predictions. All of the standard
158. Agras & Chapman, supra note 155, at 268; see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin & Selden, supra note
150; Schmalensee et al., supra note 151; Nemat Shafik & Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, Economic
Growth and Environmental Quality: Time-Series and Cross-Country Evidence (World Bank,
Working Paper No. 904, 1992).
159. The IPCC is a multinational nongovernmental organization that shared the 2007 Nobel
Peace Prize with former Vice President Al Gore. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change Home Page, http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
160. The Energy Information Administration is the federal agency charged with producing
the U.S. government's official energy forecasts. See generally Energy Information Administration
Home Page, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
161. E.g., Yang & Schneider, supra note 139; Zhongxiang Zhang, Decoupling China's Car-
bon Emissions Increase from Economic Growth: An Economic Analysis and Policy Implications,
28 WORLD DEV. 739 (2000).
162. The technical details of how these models differ from EKC-based projections are not of
great importance to the analysis that follows, but a brief description may be useful in explicating
the key similarities. EKC-based forecasts, described above in Part III.A.2, are so-called "reduced
form" models that attempt to compress several unknown variables into a single quantity and
model that quantity directly. For instance, many of the EKC models combine the final two terms
in Equation 3-per capita GDP and carbon intensity-into a single term representing per capita
carbon emissions and attempt to model this term directly, thus reducing the number of unknown
terms on the right side of the equation from three to two. The models described here are so-called
"structural" models that avoid this compression of terms and attempt to model each quantity di-
rectly. Unlike a reduced-form model, a structural model might attempt to forecast each of the
terms on the right side of Equation 2 or 3 directly. Of course, this requires that the model predict
carbon intensity, or carbon emissions per unit of energy ("carbon intensity of energy"), along
with energy usage per dollar of GDP ("energy intensity"). It is for this reason that environmental
economists think of structural models and reduced-form models as close cousins.
163. For instance, the IPCC runs six distinct models across a variety of projected inputs to
generate approximately forty different emissions scenarios. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: EMISSIONS SCENARIOS 3 (2000),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/spm/sres-en.pdf"
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studies project that Chinese CO 2 emissions will grow at an annual rate
of approximately 2.5% to 5% through 2010.164 Figure 8 displays these
projections.
FIGURE 8: STANDARD PROJECTIONS OF CHINESE
EMISSIONS GROWTH PER YEAR
C. Yang & H.S. Schneider
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Crucially, all of the standard models share two fundamental theoreti-
cal characteristics. First, each model assumes that China's carbon inten-
sity will decrease substantially over time.' 65 That is, these models as-
164. These figures are taken from Aufihammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 29. Auffhammer
and Carson calculated these particular figures from the data underlying the reported studies.
Those studies are: ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007, at 75
(2007), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/forecasting/0484(2007).pdf (forecasting 3.4%
growth); D. FRIDLEY, CHINA'S ENERGY FUTURE TO 2020 (2006) (forecasting 5.00-5.02%
growth); ZHOU DADI & MARK LEVINE, CHINA'S SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FUTURE: SCENARIOS OF
ENERGY AND CARBON EMISSIONS (2004) (forecasting 4.18% growth); IPCC, IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS ch. 5 (2000), available at http://www.grida.no/publications/
other/ipcc -sr/?src=/climate/ipcc/emission/1 14.htm (forecasting 2.58-4.82% growth); Kejun Jiang
& Xiulian Hu, Energy Demand and Emissions in 2030 in China: Scenarios and Policy Options, 7
ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y STUDIES 233 (2006) (forecasting 4.12% growth); Yang & Schneider,
supra note 139, at app. 1 (forecasting 1.93-3.10% growth over a longer period (2000 to 2025)).
165. E.g., IPCC, supra note 164, ch. 4.4.5 ("Invariably, intensities are projected to decline
with increasing income levels."); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 164, at 76 ("In all countries
and regions, carbon dioxide intensity-expressed in emissions per unit of economic output-are
projected to improve (decline) over the projection period as the world economy moves into a
post-industrial phase."). These assumptions are not always explicit; the models will occasionally
assume that, for instance, the portion of a country's GDP produced by manufacturing industries
will decrease consistently over time, or that a country will shift away from using coal for elec-
tricity generation at a consistent rate over time. Because manufacturing is more carbon intensive
per dollar than service industries, and because coal is more carbon-intensive per unit of energy
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sume that China is on the downward slope (the right-hand side) of the
EKC-that it resembles the post-1920s United States, 166 with growing
demands for environmental quality, rising proportions of economic
growth occurring in the services sector, and rapidly deploying environ-
mental technologies. This is, on its face, quite a reasonable assumption.
China cut its carbon intensity by 50% between 1994 and 2004, although
this trend has stabilized somewhat in recent years, with carbon intensity
falling only 0.8% between 2001 and 2004, the last years for which reli-
able data exist. 167 Indeed, the history of Chinese carbon intensity resem-
bles the familiar Kuznets shape.'
68
than natural gas and nuclear power, these assumptions are functionally equivalent to the broader
presumption that carbon intensity will fall over time. Indeed, most economists believe that it is
some combination of these underlying factors that drives the EKC-type behavior of carbon inten-
sity in the first place. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Figure 7.
167. Calculated from CDIAC, supra note 73, and GDP data available at All China Data Cen-
ter, supra note 43; see also JIANG LIN ET AL., ACHIEVING CHINA'S TARGET FOR ENERGY
INTENSITY REDUCTION IN 2010: AN EXPLORATION OF RECENT TRENDS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
SCENARIOS 2-3 (2006) ("[E]conomic development in China over the last few years suggests that
China may have lost its ability or will to sustain a drive to reduce energy intensity, a policy that
has been central to achievement of other of its development goals. Since 2001, China has expe-
rienced much faster growth in energy use than economic growth, with an elasticity reaching 1.6 in
2004.").
168. Calculated from CDIAC, supra note 73, and GDP data available at All China Data Cen-
ter, supra note 43. Two features of this graph are worthy of comment. First, the peculiar double-
peaked shape is likely due to Mao's Cultural Revolution, which ran from 1966 until approximate-
ly 1976 and involved substantial economic disruptions. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 12, at 116
("The economy largely stagnated because of disruptions in transportation, decline in worker dis-
cipline, and the virtual disruption of the central economic statistical apparatus."). The Cultural
Revolution coincides almost precisely with the second run-up in carbon intensity, which began in
1967 and peaked in 1977. Second, Figure 4 reports Chinese carbon intensity in metric tons of
CO 2 per million yuan of GDP, rather than per million dollars. Exchange rates have typically ho-
vered in the vicinity of 7-8.5 yuan/dollar, see Bloomberg Currency Calculator,
http://www.bloomberg.comlinvest/calculators/currency.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2009), so Chi-
na's carbon intensity in 2004 (which appears quite low from Figure 4) was approximately 2200
metric tons of carbon per million dollars of GDP (not adjusted for purchasing power parity), or
about four times that of the United States.
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FIGURE 9: CHINESE CARBON INTENSITY BY YEAR
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We will argue, however, that this relationship may not hold for all parts
of China.
Second, and relatedly, every forecast of Chinese carbon emissions-
with two important exceptions, which we discuss in greater detail be-
low' 69-- employs only country-level data.17 0 In other words, the models
rely upon emissions data for the nation of China as a whole, as opposed
to emissions data by region or province. Under the right conditions,
conditions that we believe are present here, the combination of country-
level data and aggressive assumptions regarding trends in energy inten-
sity can skew forecasts of future emissions quite dramatically. Below,
we describe and analyze the errors we believe these two key characteris-
tics have generated.
B. Errors in Chinese Emissions Forecasts
1. The Two-Nation Problem
Consider two neighboring countries: Country A and Country B.
Country A is highly industrialized and has been for more than a decade.
Its citizens have achieved a relatively high level of wealth (past the
EKC turning point for carbon intensity), but the country is beginning to
169. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 133; Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133.
170. See sources cited supra note 164.
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suffer from significant environmental degradation, including heavy
smog overhanging major cities and dangerously high levels of pollu-
tants in the drinking water. The citizens of Country A have begun to
demand governmental measures to improve environmental quality, in-
cluding curbs on carbon emissions, and Country A's economy has be-
gun to shift from industry to services as its population becomes weal-
thier. 17 An economist examining historical data would observe that
Country A's per capita carbon emissions have begun to trend down-
wards-Country A is on the downward slope of its EKC. Country A's
carbon intensity (including future projections) might look approximate-
ly like the curve in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10: COUNTRY A's CARBON INTENSITY OVER TIME
Present Day
Time
Country B is quite a bit different. Country B has a population approx-
imately four-fifths the size of Country A, but unlike Country A it is
much poorer and relatively agrarian. A smaller proportion of Country
B's citizens work in industry, fewer of its citizens reside in cities, and
171. See LIN ET AL., supra note 167, at 2 ("In the later stage of economic development, de-
mand for services often grows faster than demand for goods, leading to a shift in economic struc-
ture towards the service sector which has much lower energy and material intensity."); Agras &
Chapman, supra note 155 (making a similar point).
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Country B produces only two-fifths of the GDP of Country A. At the
same time, Country B produces comparatively little pollution and has
fewer significant environmental problems. For the citizens of Country
B, economic growth and development are the highest priorities. Accor-
dingly, fueled by a tremendous influx of foreign investment, Country B
is embarking upon a program of intensive industrialization and urbani-
zation. An economist examining historical data would observe that
Country B's carbon intensity has increased over time-Country B is on
the upward slope of its EKC. 172 Country B's carbon intensity (including
future projections) might look approximately like the curve in Figure
11.
FIGURE 11: COUNTRY B's PER CAPITA CARBON EMISSIONS
Present Day
Time
An economist analyzing Country A and Country B side-by-side
would observe from the data that the two nations are at differing points
in development, and thus that their emissions are likely to follow differ-
ent paths in the succeeding decades. Country B's emissions will grow
172. See LIN ET AL., supra note 167, at 2 ("In the early stage of economic development, indu-
strialization and urbanization tend to lead to extensive infrastructure and housing development:
both are energy- and material-intensive activities. As a result, energy intensity tends to in-
crease.").
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more rapidly as it continues to industrialize; as its citizens purchase ever
greater numbers of automobiles; and as it supplies its energy needs
through the construction of new coal plants. Country A's emissions, by
contrast, will increase much more slowly as it switches to more energy-
efficient technologies and transitions to a post-industrial service econo-
my.
Now, imagine for a moment that Country A had annexed Country B
to form a new, larger Country C. Country C is no different from the
conglomerate of Countries A+B. It has the same population, the same
growth patterns, the same environmental problems (in one area) and
lack thereof (in another), and so forth. However, because Country A is
so much more prosperous than Country B-it contributes more than
70% of the total two-nation GDP-the historical data on Country C
would strongly resemble the data on Country A alone. In particular, an
economist would observe that, like Country A, Country C's per capita
carbon emissions have begun to trend downwards--Country C is also
on the downward slope of its EKC. Lacking any knowledge of Country
C's internal heterogeneity, the economist would predict that Country
C's per capita carbon emissions would follow a downward trend similar
to Country A's. Country A's dominant economy would largely obscure
the localized upward trends in carbon intensity present in Country B.
Figure 12 illustrates this phenomenon in graphical form. The dashed
line represents predicted carbon emissions based on the available data--
which is dominated by reporting from the far wealthier Country A. The
solid line above and to the right of the dashed line represents what
Country C would actually emit, once the (now obscured) future emis-
sions from Country B come to light.
[Vol. 50:2
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FIGURE 12: COUNTRY C's ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED PER CAPITA CARBON
EMISSIONS
Present Day
Time
By now the reader is undoubtedly aware that Country C is China, and
Countries A and B are, respectively, the fictitious Eastern China and
Western China. And yet Chinese emissions forecasts have succumbed to
precisely the problems this story suggests. 173 Every carbon emissions
model, save two, employs exclusively country-level Chinese data; every
model, save one, assumes that per capita carbon emissions are trending
downwards throughout all of China; and thus every emissions projec-
tion with that single exception is vulnerable to underestimating the fu-
ture contribution of industrializing Western China to Chinese carbon
173. Two leading China scholars note:
As in many countries, there is no one clear tendency in China. We can observe neither
an overall tendency towards environmental decay jeopardising the global sustenance
base, nor a general trend towards greening the economic, political and social institutions
and practices. Understanding and interpreting current environmental developments in
China in terms of a national environmental Kuznets curve, makes little sense. To eva-
luate the way that China is currently dealing with environmental problems and chal-
lenges, and the successes, failures and dilemmas it faces, we are in need of much more
detailed analyses and insight into various institutional developments and social practic-
es.
Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 151 (emphasis added).
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output. The clearest evidence for our theory lies in the divergent ap-
proaches taken by these two outlying econometric models-and their
divergent results.
2. The International Energy Agency and Sub-National Data
The first of these two outlier studies, the International Energy Agen-
cy's (IEA) World Energy Outlook for 2007, does not deviate signifi-
cantly in methodology or results from the standard models.' 74 Neverthe-
less, its few points of departure are instructive. In 2007, for the first
time, the IEA's global forecast included sub-national data on China.
1 75
The forecast examined China's coastal regions separately: it modeled
eleven coastal Chinese provinces and cities as one area and modeled the
remainder of China (comprising thirteen provinces and several adminis-
trative regions) as another.1 76 The IEA's line of demarcation matches
neither our classification of Western China nor the CCP's delineation of
the area covered by its Western Development Program, 77 but it is not
terribly far afield. The inland (western) region, as defined by the IEA,
contains 793 million people (61% of China's total population) 178 and
produces 40% of its GDP;179 Western China, as we define it here, con-
tains 554.5 million people (43% of China's population) and produces
only 29% of its GDP.1 80 If anything, the economic differences between
Inland China and Coastal China, as delineated by the IEA, are even
starker than the differences between Eastern and Western China, as we
define them. Per the IEA's geographic definitions, the coastal (eastern)
region's per capita GDP is 2.26 times higher than the western re-
174. The IEA, a nongovernmental organization based in Paris, publishes annual climate and
emissions forecasts for the entire globe. See International Energy Agency Home Page,
http://www.iea.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2009). Because data only becomes available after sever-
al months and climate models take a great deal of time to construct, energy forecasts often lag
behind the present-day realities. The IEA's 2007 forecast is the newest available.
175. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 133, at 405-19. The lEA has been publishing
global energy forecasts for quite a number of years, and so this was a significant departure from
past practice.
176. See id. at 404-05.
177. See Naughton, supra note 54, at 256.
178. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 133, at 255. China has a total population of ap-
proximately 1.3 billion. Id. at 59.
179. See id. at 403.
180. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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gion's; 181 by our definitions, Eastern China's per capita GDP is 1.99
times higher than Western China's.'
82
Unfortunately, however, the lEA paints over this clear divide be-
tween East and West with a critical set of largely indiscriminate as-
sumptions. Principal among them is the projected growth of the services
sector of the Chinese economy. The IEA's projections of future carbon
emissions are driven substantially by its assumptions about the share of
GDP produced within the services sector. 183 According to the IEA, in
2005 the services sector was responsible for 40% of GDP in the East
and 38% of GDP in the West. The TEA then assumes that services will
grow to 43% of GDP in both locations by 2015 (implying faster services
growth inland).' 8 4 In all likelihood, these assumptions are highly unrea-
listic-the less-developed west is unlikely to see its services sector grow
more rapidly than the east-and make sense only if Western China's
economy already resembles Eastern China's in substantial part. 85 The
IEA's combination of assumptions and definitional choices effectively
washes out a substantial portion of China's East-West heterogeneity,
muting the effects of examining the Two Chinas independently.
Nonetheless, the IEA's projections do manage to exploit some dis-
tinctions between Inland and Coastal China. The IEA predicts that car-
bon emissions will grow 5.2% annually over the next decade in Coastal
China' 86 and 5.6% annually in Inland China.' 87 Over the same time pe-
riod, carbon intensity will decline by 2.6% annually in Coastal China
181. Calculated from All China Data Center, supra note 43, based upon the definitions pro-
vided supra note 176.
182. See supra text accompanying note 46. This fact should dispel any notion that we might
have cherry-picked the data or drawn an arbitrary line in order to accentuate the divergence be-
tween East and West. Ours is obviously not the most extreme line (on economic grounds) that
could have been drawn; we chose it in substantial part to demonstrate geographic and ethnic, as
well as economic, differences. (More to the point, the raison d'&tre of this exercise was to illu-
strate the stark divide between East and West; on that account, we cannot be guilty of cherry-
picking unless we have somehow gerrymandered the Chinese boundary line. Cf Samuel Issacha-
roff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593 (2002) (discussing American
political gerrymandering)).
183. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 133, at 284-85, 407.
184. See id. Recall that services are less energy- and carbon-intensive than industry. A growth
in the services sector of an economy implies a diminution in carbon intensity.
185. See LN ET AL., supra note 167, at 2 (explaining the different stages in development at
which various sectors of the economy typically grow); Agras & Chapman, supra note 155.
186. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 142, at 415.
187. This figure is calculated by the authors from lEA predictions of emissions growth in
Coastal China, emissions growth in China as a whole, and the proportion of emissions currently
produced by Coastal China. Id. at 313, 415. The lEA does not release separate data on its predic-
tions for Inland China.
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and 1.5% annually in Inland China.' 88 Even by picking up this minimal
variation, the IEA arrives at slightly higher projections than any of the
other models we have described thus far: Chinese emissions growth of
5.4% over the next decade.' 89 The IEA's forecast is certainly superior to
the typical models (which will naturally assume consistent rates of de-
clining carbon intensity throughout China). At the same time, no model
of Chinese emissions will succeed in fully accounting for China's geo-
graphic heterogeneity unless it utilizes province-level data and permits
substantial variance in economic trends among provinces, allowing for
the possibility that some provinces are currently on the upward slope of
their EKC. Alone among Chinese carbon projections, one study pos-
sesses both of these features.
3. Modeling Heterogeneity: The AufJhammer & Carson Study
In a 2007 paper, Maximilian Auffhammer and Richard T. Carson re-
calculate projected Chinese carbon emissions through 2010.190 Their
study differs methodologically from previous work in two principal re-
spects. 191 First, Auffhammer and Carson "allow for spatial dependence
in emissions across provinces, which has been shown to improve fore-
casts of aggregate variables if there is sufficient heterogeneity at lower
levels of aggregation."'' 92 In other words, they employ province-level
188. These figures are calculated by the authors from lEA predictions of GDP growth in
Coastal China, China as a whole, and the preceding predictions on emissions growth. Id. at 284,
407, 415. The similar rates of emissions growth in Inland and Coastal China indicate that the dif-
ferent trends in carbon intensity are driven substantially by different rates of GDP growth.
189. Id. at 313. This is not a perfectly tuned comparison; the results we reported earlier are
from predictions of Chinese emissions growth over the next five years, while the lEA results
represent predictions over the next ten years. The lEA does not release year-by-year data or any
other information that would allow us to bridge this discrepancy. If anything, however, these
numbers likely understate the IEA's projections of Chinese emissions over the next five years,
which are likely to be higher than the five years that follow.
190. Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133.
191. Auffhammer and Carson state at the beginning of their paper that they are making four
contributions to the literature. However, two of those contributions relate directly to "spatial de-
pendence in emissions across provinces"--in other words, the province-level heterogeneity in
emissions we discuss here. Id. at 2. A third involves a dynamic search for the best theoretical
model among a variety of preexisting candidates (none of which should cause their results to di-
verge substantially from what other studies have found), and the fourth is simply their selection of
an "annually updated and publicly available source of data, which allows for frequently updatea-
ble forecasts" but again should have little or no effect on their current results. Id. As the title of
their paper indicates, their results are being driven by the province-level data they employ. Id. at
2-3.
192. Id. at 2.
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data.193 Substantial geographic heterogeneity is certainly present in Chi-
na; in 2004, the coastal provinces of Eastern China, which account for
only 14% of the country's land area, produced 54% of the country's
carbon emissions.' 94 Second, unlike other projections of China's carbon
output, Auffhammer and Carson do not assume that any (much less
every) Chinese province will have uniformly decreasing carbon intensi-
ty. They allow each province's emissions to fall on either the upward or
the downward slope of the Kuznets curve, as appropriate to the prov-
ince.
Auffhammer and Carson's results diverge strikingly from all of the
foregoing projections of Chinese carbon emissions. As previously
noted, the standard models forecast that Chinese CO2 emissions will
grow at an annual rate of approximately 2.5 to 5% through 2010.195
Auffhammer and Carson, by contrast, predict that during the same pe-
riod Chinese CO 2 emissions will grow at an annual rate greater than
11%, even assuming relatively conservative Chinese economic growth
rates.' 96 (By way of comparison, U.S. emissions have grown at an ap-
proximate annual rate of 1.5% over the past decade.) 197 We produce the
results of these studies in Figure 13 below.
193. Auffhammer has elsewhere achieved superior predictive results using region-level emis-
sions data. See, e.g., Maximilian Auffhammer & Ralf Steinhauser, The Future Trajectory of U.S.
C0 2 Emissions: The Role of State vs. Aggregate Information, 47 J. REGIONAL SCI. 47 (2007).
194. Aufthammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 9. Auffhammer and Carson count as "coastal
provinces" the provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhe-
jiang, Fujian, Hainan, Guangdong, and Guangxi. The exact designations are not particularly im-
portant, though, because Auffhammer and Carson have province-level data and thus do not need
to arbitrarily divide the country like the lEA does. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 133.
195. See supra note 164 (referencing forecasts and graphs predicting future growth); see also
Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 29 (referencing prior studies).
196. Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 29. More aggressive estimates of China's
economic growth result in carbon emissions growth rates closer to 12%. Id.
197. Calculated from data contained in CDIAC, supra note 73.
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FIGURE 13: FORECASTS OF YEARLY CHINESE EMISSIONS GROWTH
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If Auffhammer and Carson are correct, the standard projections could
be underestimating China's emissions output by literally hundreds of
millions of tons of carbon dioxide over the next half-decade. 98 Auff-
hammer and Carson do not suggest any particular explanation for the
profound effects generated by their introduction of province-level data,
nor do they speculate as to the internal state of affairs in China that
might give rise to divergent growth patterns. They mention in passing
the fact that their model predicts slower emissions growth in eastern
provinces than in western provinces, but they do not investigate this
point. 99 We believe that the explanation for their highly distinctive pre-
dictions lies in the Two Chinas theory we advance here.
200
198. This estimate is based upon our own calculations. See discussion infra Part III.C. We
discuss the significance of this potential underestimation in Part IV, infra.
199. They write:
There is considerable variation in individual provinces' elasticities with respect to the
previous period's emissions, as indicated by the parameters on the province specific
lagged emissions. A smaller parameter estimate on a province's lagged per capita waste
gas emissions indicates faster speed of adjustment. Correspondingly, a larger (closer to
one) parameter estimate would indicate a relatively slower rate of adjustment. Upon ca-
sual inspection, the provinces with lagged parameter values that are substantially below
the average tend to be the coastal provinces that have received substantial [foreign direct
investment], whereas the provinces with substantially higher lagged parameter values
tend to be provinces which are large coal producers with substantial concentrations of
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C. Ramifications
As Cass Sunstein and others have noted, attempts to reach a global
accord on greenhouse gases are hamstrung by a fundamental problem:
China, already the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases,20' would
incur the highest costs of any nation if carbon emissions are taxed or
capped. At the same time, however, China faces comparatively little
downside risk from global warming. 20 2 As a matter of pure economic
self-interest, China has little reason to support a global climate agree-
ment.203
The possibility that Chinese carbon emissions may be increasing at
an annual rate of over 11%, rather than approximately 4%, as previous
models would have it, stands to exacerbate this problem substantially. In
2004, the last year for which there exists reliable data, China emitted
over 1.3 billion metric tons of carbon. 20 4 If Auffhammer and Carson are
heavy industry. The estimates are consistent with current efforts to decrease emissions
of air pollutants in provinces hosting Olympic events as well as provinces which are at-
tracting the majority of foreign tourists, which are largely the coastal provinces with
lower estimated lag parameters.
Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 17.
200. Of course, it is possible that Auffhammer and Carson are not correct (by which we mean
no more accurate than other extant models), although there is substantial evidence in their favor.
The Auffhammer and Carson model generates retrospective predictions for emissions from 2000
through 2003 that are far closer to observed CO 2 emissions than any of the competing models.
See Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 29; CDIAC, supra note 73. Moreover, this lone
study, by itself, proves nothing with regard to our central theory. This is by no means a perfect
apples-to-apples comparison, because Auffhammer and Carson employ a slightly different me-
thodology than the standard structural models. Again, the conclusions we advance here are tenta-
tive. We believe, however, that the principal effect of Auffhammer and Carson's different metho-
dological tack is to capture the heterogeneity among Chinese provinces and cure the problems
that attend projections based only on nation-level Chinese data, and we mean only to argue that
Auffhammer and Carson's results are suggestive, not that they are dispositive. But we find it ar-
resting that it has achieved such atypical results-in the direction the theory would predict-
through little more than the substitution of province-level data. If our theory of western develop-
ment and its effect on future Chinese emissions were correct, one would expect to find echoes of
this phenomenon within the data. If nothing else, Auffhammer and Carson's study provides evi-
dence of those echoes.
201. See China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/2Oiht-emit. 1.
6227564.html.
202. One projection suggests that China will suffer damages equivalent to 0.22% of GDP
from 2.5 degrees Celsius of warming, compared with 0.45% in the United States, 0.50% in Japan,
2.83% in Western Europe, and even higher losses in India and Africa. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS &
JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2000);
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1682-83. Only Russia stands to fare better than China: global warming
may actually improve its economy. NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra.
203. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1687.
204. CDIAC, supra note 73. Note that we give the measure here in tons of carbon, rather than
2010] 379
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correct, China will emit, in total, approximately 20 billion metric tons of
carbon from 2010 through 2015; according to the standard calculations,
China will emit slightly more than 11.4 billion metric tons over the
same period.2 °5 This disparity amounts to 8.6 billion metric tons of car-
bon over six years: an increase of 76% over previous forecasts. If the
costs to China of complying with a global emissions accord were
viewed as unaffordable based on standard accounts of emissions
growth, they are flatly prohibitive according to Auffhammer and Car-
son's (likely correct) numbers. Suppose, by way of illustration, that a
proposed climate agreement assumed the form of a global tax on carbon
emissions. z 6 William Nordhaus, perhaps the leading economist in this
field, has proposed a tax that would start at $27 per metric ton of emit-
ted carbon 0 7 and rise 2 to 3% each year.208 At those prices, the addi-
tional 8.6 billion tons of carbon that China will emit from 2010 through
2015 alone would cost it approximately $288 billion extra in taxes. 209
We argued in Parts I and II that China's internal politics and its plans
to continue the extensive industrialization of the West will severely
tons of carbon dioxide, as is the convention among many climate scientists. In order to calculate
emissions in terms of carbon dioxide, one would simply multiply the tonnage of carbon by 3.667,
which is the ratio of the two molecules' molecular weights.
205. Figures calculated by the authors based upon data from CDIAC, supra note 73, and pro-
jections from Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133.
206. This is one of two options that economists have proposed, the other being a "cap-and-
trade system" in which nations (and, at a more local level, industries) receive emissions permits
that trade on the open market. Though the example in the text employs a carbon tax, the cost to
China of increased emissions under a cap-and-trade system would be very similar; under either
system, the goal is simply to set the price of carbon appropriately. We explore these two options
in slightly more detail later. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
207. NORDHAUS, supra note 5, at 11-15. Nordhaus estimates the social cost of emitting a ton
of carbon at $30, and calculates, after running a variety of simulations, that a tax of $27 would
optimally maximize worldwide wealth. Id. These figures are likely quite conservative: carbon
emissions permits are currently trading in the European Union at nearly $50 per metric ton, and
the lEA has suggested that carbon will have to be priced at $200 to $500 per ton before global
warming can be halted or reversed. See Ed Crooks, IEA Calls for Energy Revolution, FIN. TIMES,
June 7, 2008, at 7. We will employ Nordhaus' substantially more conservative figures here; if the
tEA is correct, the point is even stronger.
208. NORDHAUS, supra note 5, at 16.
209. Figure calculated by the authors based upon the projections described above in Part
III.B.3 and the taxation amounts listed in NORDHAUS, supra note 5. The authors assumed that
Chinese emissions would continue to grow from 2010 through 2015 at a similar rate to the rate of
growth from 2000 to 2010. This assumption is, if anything, overly conservative. In addition, a
number of other actors, including former Vice President Al Gore, the British Stem Report, and
the government of Germany, have implicitly proposed carbon taxes that would rise to approx-
imately three hundred dollars per metric ton within the next two decades. Id. Nordhaus does not
believe that taxes at that level are priced optimally, but it is always possible that they will become
politically popular, at least in some countries.
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complicate efforts to involve China in a global climate accord. Here, we
suggested that China's pattern of development will in fact lead to sub-
stantially greater carbon emissions over the next several decades than all
but one model has forecast, and we provide a theoretical basis to subs-
tantiate that lone model's findings. The question that remains is whether
China's development will prove fatal to any possible agreement to limit
emissions, or whether the framework exists for an accord that would
both accommodate China's economic destiny and prove politically feas-
ible within the United States and the European Union.210 We take up
this question in the next Part.
IV. A WAY FORWARD?
This Article began by adopting the near-consensus view among
economists, climatologists, and legal scholars that an agreement to curb
greenhouse gas emissions is in the best interest of the world as a whole.
If such an accord is to be successful, it must include China and the rest
of the developing world, in addition to the United States and Europe.211
A treaty regime akin to the Kyoto Protocol, which imposed no curbs
upon China, the world's leading polluter, will be largely ineffectual in
combating global warming.212 Nothing that we have found, and nothing
that we have argued here, has altered our view on that point. It is worth
exploring, then, whether the potential for reaching an agreement with
China remains, and what structure such an agreement (if any) might as-
sume.
A. Status Quo: A Climate Accord Without Side Payments
Much of the current debate over the framework for a potential cli-
mate accord has centered on whether the United States, the European
Union, or other nations will be forced to compensate China for its par-
ticipation in an agreement to curb greenhouse gases. A number of scho-
lars have already concluded that these types of side payments are both
210. It is of course possible that China does not deserve to expand economically in the fa-
shion it intends-in the sense that it has a moral obligation to act otherwise-or that the United
States would be better off if it did not simply acquiesce to China's intentions but instead opposed
them. We are not interested in either of these possibilities. We deal only in the realm of the actual,
and we do not see any means by which the United States could prevent China from industrializing
the West short of a major war, an option that we obviously view as unacceptable.
211. See Sunstein, supra note 5 (explaining that it is necessary for all major industrialized na-
tions to participate in a climate regime if it is to succeed).
212. Id.
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necessary and appropriate, and we agree entirely with their conclusions.
However, we intend to revisit this issue briefly here in order to illustrate
one additional hurdle that any agreement without side payments to Chi-
na is likely to encounter.
One potential treaty framework-and the one that most closely re-
sembles the current bargaining positions of Europe and the United
States'-is an agreement that awards benefits and burdens essentially
according to the status quo as it exists at the time the treaty is made.
Such an arrangement would be possible under either a carbon tax or a
cap-and-trade regime.213 As a carbon tax, it would simply involve a
global tax imposed equally upon every country in the world, with no
special dispensations or variable rates. In a status quo-normalized cap-
and-trade regime, pollution rights would be distributed proportionately
to each country's current emissions levels. This would effectively
benchmark pollution rights according to the status quo and force coun-
tries to buy credits-or allow them to sell-based on the extent to which
they deviate from their pre-treaty behavior.
As a number of scholars have pointed out, China will never agree to
such an arrangement (and indeed, China has expressed similar senti-
ments publicly).214 The reasons for this intransigence are well-
established,215 and we pause here to note only one of them. Under a sta-
213. A carbon tax, as we mentioned above, is simply a tax imposed on every polluter based
on the amount of atmospheric carbon that polluter emits. Under a cap-and-trade regime, nations
would agree upon the total amount of worldwide emissions they were willing to tolerate (the cap)
and allocate rights to emit (up to that cap) among themselves. Countries (or the companies to
whom they had given the pollution rights) could then buy or sell those emissions rights on an
open market, allowing the pollution rights to end up in the hands of the highest-value users. See
Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31, 35-55 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed.
2000); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic ofArsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2297-99 (2002) (describ-
ing the putative advantages of a cap-and-trade system).
214. China Unveils Climate Change Plan, BBC NEWS, June 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/asia-pacific/6717671 .stm.
215. China has argued that each person on Earth-not each country-is entitled to an equal
share of prosperity (and by extension an equal share of energy production and carbon emissions).
Accordingly, China maintains that only per capita allotments of pollution entitlements are norma-
tively acceptable. China has also noted that the United States and Western Europe are responsible
for the vast majority of existing human-produced atmospheric carbon, which has already pro-
duced warming effects. See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 32 (2007) (suggesting that nations should be held responsible for
climate change based on contributions to existing atmospheric carbon); Daniel A. Farber, Appor-
tioning Climate Change Costs, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 21, 45-46 (2008) (analyzing and
describing the objection on equitable grounds to apportioning costs based on current emissions).
But see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a
Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51 (2009) (criticizing per capita allocation of greenhouse gas
[Vol. 50:2
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tus quo-based climate regime, China would almost certainly have to pay
more in compliance costs (either in carbon taxes or by purchasing addi-
tional pollution credits) than it would benefit from avoiding warming.216
The analysis we presented above suggests that this problem is even
worse than previously believed; compliance might cost China hundreds
of billions of dollars more than current estimates predict.
217
To this reason-which is likely dispositive on its own-we add
another, more pernicious explanation. Suppose (counterfactually) that
China would benefit in the net from even a status quo-based climate ac-
cord-that the threat to China from warming exceeded the cost of com-
pliance.218 If this were the case, China might be persuaded to join a cli-
mate treaty that served its own self-interest. However, the benefits and
burdens of such a treaty would not be distributed evenly: Eastern China
has the greater share of low-lying land that would be threatened by ris-
ing sea levels induced by warming219 and would realize the lion's share
of the benefits; Western China will likely rely more heavily on carbon-
intensive industrialization and electrification for future development and
would bear a disproportionate share of the costs. Moreover, the CCP
cannot easily redistribute the benefits of a climate accord from East to
West. We noted above the CCP's ongoing difficulties in maintaining
taxation and other authority over the provinces. 220 These problems are
aggravated in the context of a climate treaty because the benefits of such
a treaty-lives not lost, diseases not spread, and land not destroyed-are
difficult to monetize and redistribute.
As we have argued ad nauseum, continued western development is a
political imperative for the CCP. 22' Consequently, the CCP might reject
even an agreement that benefited China in the net, for fear that it would
harm its own political position. Our analysis, then, suggests a second
precondition: before it will join an international climate accord, the CCP
must be capable of distributing the benefits of such an agreement such
permits in a cap-and-trade system).
216. Sunstein, supra note 5 (noting the cost-benefit calculations of major emitting nations).
217. See supra Part III.C.
218. It is conceivable that this is the case, given the uncertainty that surrounds even the best
economic models of climate change. See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Im-
pacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1655 (2008). China could be a great deal more
at risk from wanning than conventional models recognize, or the technological response to emis-
sions curbs could be swifter and less expensive than anyone has predicted.
219. See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 133, at 371 ("Over 18,000 km. of coastline
and more than 5,000 islands are at risk in the event of a rise in sea level.").
220. See supra Part II.A.2.
221. See supra Part I.B.2-I.C.
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that no region of the country-particularly the West-is made worse
off. We call this the "internal pareto" condition, and we consider two
frameworks that might satisfy this condition below.
B. Side Payments
In the face of Chinese disinterest in participating in a global climate
regime, the only workable solution might be to compensate China for
joining such an agreement through a series of side payments.222 Under a
carbon tax, if China stood to lose more than it gained, the United States
and Western Europe could make up the shortfall through direct pay-
ments that would allow China to "break even" (at worst) on its partici-
pation in the agreement. 223 Under a cap-and-trade regime, China could
simply be afforded enough valuable pollution credits to cover its losses
from joining the global cap. (China could either use the credits to avoid
some of the costs of reducing carbon emissions or sell them on the open
market.)
China would be certain to benefit in the net from these proposals, but
it is unclear whether China's internal pareto condition would be satis-
fied. Imagine a climate agreement that imposed $200 billion in econom-
ic costs upon China but conferred $100 billion in benefits from envi-
ronmental damage avoided and included a $100 billion side payment
from the United States. If the economic cost were unevenly distri-
buted-for instance, $140 billion to Western China, and $60 billion to
Eastern China-and the environmental benefits fell disproportionately
upon the East-$80 billion worth of benefits to the East, and $20 billion
to the West-Western China would be left with a $120 billion "short-
fall" that the American side payment would not fully cover. The CCP
could endeavor to redistribute tax revenues to cover Western China's
deficit (such a solution might very well be possible) but this is hardly a
facile measure for a nation with a disproportionately high percentage of
sub-national expenditures and, consequently, a low rate of national
spending. The fictional $20 billion deficit in this example even exceeds
222. STEWART & WIENER, supra note 5, at 15 (suggesting that China be "paid to play");
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1695-96.
223. The United States itself may not have an enormous amount to lose from global warming,
at least according to some projections. By one estimate, 2.5 degrees Celsius of warming will only
cause damage to the United States equal to 0.45% of GDP (as compared with damage to China of
0.22% of GDP). Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1683. Among the world's wealthy nations, the true
losers from global warming will be the wealthy industrialized countries of Europe, who face
damages equal to 2.83% of GDP. Id. Thus, as a practical matter, it might be that Europe, not the
United States, will be compelled to take the lead in compensating China.
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the central government's spending on the Western Development Pro-
gram.
224
In such a situation it might well be in the interest of the people (and
government) of Eastern China to buy Western China's participation
through intra-national side payments. Yet it is hard to imagine such an
agreement becoming feasible. Even if the provinces of Eastern China
agree to subsidize Western China pursuant to an international climate
treaty, there will be nothing to stop Eastern China from reneging on its
agreement and free-riding on the CCP's national enforcement power
once the treaty has been signed. The CCP's ability to hold Eastern Chi-
na to its bargain is no greater or lesser than its ability to simply collect
the necessary revenues from Eastern China in the first place, which (as
noted above) is limited. Eastern China's promise is independently worth
extremely little.
The larger problem with arrangements involving international side
payments is that they may not be politically palatable for those countries
asked to foot the bill, particularly the United States. Some in the United
States have come to view China as America's main strategic rival,225 a
competitor for economic prominence, military might, and even the
world's remaining oil supplies. 226 The United States is already running a
tremendous trade deficit with China, sending billions of dollars to China
on a yearly basis.227 China's refusal to let its currency rise against the
dollar-holding down the price of Chinese imports and perpetuating the
wide trade gap--has caused serious consternation among American po-
licymakers.228 At the same time, China has now passed the United
224. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. In 2000 and 2001, $130 billion yuan equaled
less than $20 billion dollars (approximately $0.12/yuan).
225. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 3 (describing the Chinese-American rivalry); ROBERT G.
SuLTTER, CHINA'S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS 77-99 (2005) (examining China's rela-
tions with the United States, particularly from a military and economic perspective); see also
NINA HACHIGIAN & MONA SUTPHEN, THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY: HOW THE U.S. CAN
THRIVE AS OTHER POWERS RISE (2008) (discussing policy options to moderate the effect of Chi-
na's rise on U.S. interests); David M. Lampton, China's Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America's
Expense, in POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA'S NEW DYNAMICS 306 (David Shambaugh ed.,
2005) (suggesting that in order to benefit from the rise of China, the United States must replenish
its soft power and refrain from adopting protectionist policies).
226. See David Zweig & Bi Jianhai, China's Global Hunt for Energy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 2005, at 25.
227. In 2007, the U.S. trade deficit with China exceeded $258 billion. U.S. Census Bureau,
Foreign Trade Div., Trade with China: 2007, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/
c5700.html#2007 (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
228. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Jim Bunning, Bunning, Stabenow, Bayh Introduce Leg-
islation Geared Towards Ending Currency Manipulation by China (Apr. 3, 2008), available at
http://stabenow.senate.gov/press/2008/040308Currency.htm).
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States as the world's leading carbon emitter, and American politicians
view the notion that the United States should offer concessions to China
to curb its environmentally destructive behavior with the same incredul-
ity that Chinese politicians have expressed towards the idea that China
should curb its emissions as a remedy for the damage caused by more
than a century of American industrialization. 229 Any solution that in-
volves the United States further compromising what it already views as
an imbalanced relationship with China may simply be unworkable polit-
ically.2
3 °
What is worse, to the extent that this option were ever politically
feasible, the updated emissions projections we present here make it sub-
stantially less so. Again, by these estimations, between 2010 and 2015
China will emit 8.6 billion tons of carbon more than the standard mod-
els have predicted.231 Under one leading carbon tax scenario, this will
amount to an additional emissions tax of $288 billion during that six-
year period. 2  This is hardly an insignificant amount of money, particu-
larly if the United States is paying. The political future of anti-warming
measures is, of course, highly uncertain, and the United States may yet
come to a point at which it is willing to make significant side payments
to even a strategic rival such as China in order to facilitate a global
agreement.233 Nonetheless, it would be hard to imagine such a political
229. See Kishore Mahbubani, The Case Against the West: America and Europe in the Asian
Century, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2008, at 111, 120 ("Since 1850, China has contributed less
than 8 percent of the world's total emissions of carbon dioxide, whereas the United States is re-
sponsible for 29 percent and western Europe is responsible for 27 percent.").
230. See, e.g., Posner Posting, supra note 135 ("Will it be politically possible to give massive
subsidies to China, an authoritarian state with a bad human rights record and increasingly per-
ceived as a global rival?").
231. See supra Part III.C.
232. See supra text accompanying note 209. Again, these are conservative estimates that may
be substantially understated. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (describing calls for car-
bon taxes far in excess of what Nordhaus has recommended).
233. Certainly it would not be absurd to suggest that domestic pressure for the United States
to negotiate a workable global climate agreement will grow over the coming decades. One indica-
tion of this trend is that during the U.S. presidential election of 2008, the presidential nominees of
both political parties publicly supported a global climate agreement. See Elizabeth Bumiller &
John M. Broder, McCain Differs With Bush on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/us/politics/12cnd-mccain.html (describing Sen-
ator McCain's call "for a mandatory limit on greenhouse gas emissions in the United States" and
his support of a global cap-and-trade regime that would include China and India); Organizing for
America - New Energy for America, http://my.barackobama.comlpage/content/
newenergy-more#emissions (last visited Dec. 17, 2009) ("Implement an economy-wide cap-and-
trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent by 2050."). However, the same ris-
ing global levels of fossil fuel consumption that drive Americans' concern regarding global
warming will also likely drive American antipathy towards China as the two nations compete for
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climate arising within the foreseeable future, and the possibility that a
global climate accord will be founded upon side payments from the
United States to China strikes us as remote.
Despite our pessimism about the prospects for a workable, effective
climate agreement that includes China and the United States, we never-
theless continue to believe that an agreement is possible, though a full
explication of the contours for a workable climate agreement is well
beyond the scope of this Article. Scholars have suggested a variety of
potential approaches and solutions, 234 and we consider it conceivable
that one or more of them will bear fruit. Perhaps the most promising
possibility is a massive technology transfer to China as part of a global
climate accord. 5 Such a regime would have a number of advantages
over a pure cash exchange. First, it would directly target the costs to
China of curbing emissions by reducing the price of transitioning to
cleaner technologies. From the Chinese perspective, a transfer of effi-
cient energy technologies is equivalent to cash and would satisfy Chi-
na's internal pareto condition. Second, the United States and Europe
could be certain that China would use the technological "side payments"
appropriately-they would not have to be concerned with the threat that
direct foreign aid would wind up in the hands of the Chinese military or
some other politically unacceptable arm of the government. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, such an arrangement could be sold politically
in the United States and Europe as a boon to domestic firms. The tech-
nology transferred to China could be derived from American or Euro-
pean industry, a move that would (among other things) afford those
firms a competitive advantage in the lucrative market for environmental
goods.
Technology transfers in lieu of direct cash payments would hardly
overcome all of the problems confronting a global climate accord. It is
resources. The process of national "belt-tightening" that will accompany higher fuel prices and
precede any meaningful American move towards alternative sources of energy or an international
climate accord will not encourage the American public to send even greater capital overseas.
234. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Anu Bradford, "Rewarding
the Punisher": Enticing Compliance with International Treaties (Oct. 31, 2009) (unpublished ma-
nuscript) (on file with author) (proposing an innovative system involving pre-commitment to a
mixture of rewards and sanctions designed to induce compliance with international agreements,
such as climate change accords).
235. This idea may be slowly gaining currency among some developing nations. At the G-8
summit, India-the world's fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide-requested "aid and technol-
ogy from industrialized countries to help it cut emissions." Michael Abramowitz & Blaine Har-
den, Bush Makes Final Push for Global Climate Deal, WASH. POST, July 3, 2008, at A12. For a
similar suggestion, see Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, Intellectual Property, and Technology
Transfer to Address Climate Change, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 79-86 (2009).
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nevertheless possible that an agreement structured around massive tech-
nology transfers will be both equally attractive to China and more polit-
ically palatable to the United States and Europe than the alternative. In
light of the hurdles those nations will face in reaching an agreement on
greenhouse emissions, such advantages should not be eschewed lightly.
CONCLUSION
If a global agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions is to suc-
ceed, China-now the world's leading polluter-must participate. Yet
there are a number of hurdles particular to China's domestic political
dynamics that will likely complicate such an agreement. Rampant Chi-
nese growth over the past several decades has led to the creation of what
are effectively two nations: wealthier, more industrialized Eastern Chi-
na, and poorer, more agrarian Western China. The result, from the pers-
pective of the world community, is the problem of the Two Chinas. The
existence of these very different "nations" side-by-side within one polit-
ical unit threatens to diminish China's interest in limiting greenhouse
gases, as well as its capacity to do so. The social and economic dispari-
ties between East and West have made rapid western growth a political
imperative for the Chinese Communist Party, which will be loath to sign
any agreement that might stunt this growth. China has also divested
substantial authority to the provinces and is burdened by an inefficient
regulatory structure that leaves the central administration without the
power necessary to impose environmental limitations on the provinces.
Finally, economic heterogeneity within China masks substantial in-
creases in Chinese carbon outputs over the coming years-increases
that economic projections employing only national-level data have not
succeeded in capturing.
President Hu Jintao's speech at the 2009 United Nations Summit on
Climate Change demonstrates well the effects of China's internal dy-
namics on its incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. While ex-
horting developed countries to "take up their responsibility and provide
new, additional, adequate and predictable financial support. . . [and]
access to climate-friendly technologies" 236 to poorer countries, President
Hu refused to commit China to binding targets, instead suggesting that
China "will endeavor ' 237 to meet various environmental goals by 2020.
236. Hu Jintao's Speech on Climate Change, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html.
237. Id.
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This is unsurprising; for President Hu, "[d]eveloping countries [like
China] need to strike a balance between economic growth, social devel-
opment and environmental protection ....,238 In striking this balance,
China is likely to view the consequences from lower economic growth
and social instability more seriously than those from climate change.
Despite these obstacles, it is not inconceivable that the international
community will reach some sort of agreement. For instance, general
statements of intent, weak non-binding commitments, and unambitious
emissions targets are certainly possible, if not likely, at the 2009 United
Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Subsequent inter-
national conferences may produce more of the same. Rather, we believe
that while forging a binding, substantive and effective climate agree-
ment that includes a single China would have been difficult, forging one
with the Two Chinas offers an even greater challenge.
238. Neil MacFarquhar, Proposals Lag Behind Promises on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2009, at A5.
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